The Relationship of Biblical Studies to the History of Religions School, with Reference to the Scientific Study of Religion

The Current State of Affairs and Nineteenth-Century Background

Theologians both Catholic and Protestant have consistently assumed theology to be related to the Church. This reflects the idea that theology is a confessional discipline. In Germany the close binding of theology to the Church was strengthened after the First World War and persisted through the Nazi era. Since then this bond has in fact underpinned the growing significance of Church development worldwide. The roots of this correlation of Church and theology are found as early as the nineteenth century. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) decreed: “Even the scientific activity of the theologian must have for its object the promotion of the Church’s welfare—and partakes, therefore, of a clerical character.” In a similar vein, Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889) remarked that “theology is only conceivable as service to the Christian religious community.”

The most influential theologian of the twentieth century, Karl Barth (1886–1968), immediately affirmed the aim of theology by the title of his main work—Church Dogmatics. In this view of dogmatics as foundational to church teaching, preachers are officially forbidden to impart in their homilies such historical insights as the non-historicity of the virgin birth. “[The Church] will at least require of its servants, even if there are some who personally cannot understand this ordinance, that they treat their private road as a private road and do...
not make it an object of their proclamation, that if they personally cannot affirm it and so (unfortunately) withhold it from their congregations, they must at least pay the dogma the respect of keeping silence about it.”

With Barth, as with many other representatives of so-called Dialectical Theology, we see a contradiction between the dogmatic and the historical approaches. If historical work has absolutely no prior knowledge of what it should find—as indeed it should not—how could it know that these findings are meant to have a positive function within the Church? Furthermore, if it is irrevocably established—as in the case of the virgin birth—that dogma and history contradict each other, what can the historian do except declare the Church’s statement to be untrue?

These and similar questions have been asked repeatedly since the emergence of historical criticism, and especially by the members of the History of Religions School. Gustav Krüger, for example, made the point that historical work was uneccclesiastical insofar as “it works, absolutely and overall, with standards that have been obtained completely apart from the ecclesiastical sphere. The work is un-eccclesiastical as well in that during its execution I never consider the Church at all—that is, whether my results will disturb it or not … I look for the real work of the academic teacher in something that must shock the Church.”

Krüger’s contemporary, William Wrede, in a programmatic piece expressly attacked the thesis that theology had to serve the Church. He wrote: “This formula, very frequently employed, harkens back to Schleiermacher. And as applied to all of theology as it is connected to history—therefore as applied to everything in the biblical area—the formula is either wholly untenable or completely devoid of substance.”

Finally, Walter Köhler, one of the editors of the first edition of the encyclopedic Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, wrote in a letter to publisher Paul Siebeck, “Indeed, for my part, I certainly maintain that the lexicon should give voice to the young—and even to the radical. It should in all consciousness express the standpoint of the young liberal, religionsgeschichtliche Schule…. In my opinion, [forever casting] sideways glances in the Church’s direction grates against the soul.”

A descendant of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule, Swiss pastor and psychoanalyst Oskar Pfister—who had a cordial relationship with Sigmund Freud—remarked, apropos of this theme, “A science of the Christian faith is just as little Christian as the science of criminology is criminal. The goal must not be usefulness to the Church but rather truth alone, in and of itself…. Science with results predetermined by the Church is scholasticism.”

We thus draw a provisional conclusion: theology as a scientific discipline seeks the truth, and in this it is connected to all other university disciplines. For this reason Church theology can never be classified as a scientific pursuit.
The Understanding of *Wissenschaft* in the History of Religions School

**Preliminary Orientation**

The History of Religions School (HRS) designates a group of German Protestant theologians of the later Wilhelminian Reich, who were for the most part New Testament scholars. Their main conviction was that religion was not fixed; rather, it developed in accordance with human history. The HRS was not a theological school in the sense of being a group of followers and developers of a single person’s thoughts. Instead, it arose over a period of about fifteen years from the common life and work of young theologians who earned their qualifications as a professor mainly from the University of Göttingen, beginning in 1886. This group formed around Albert Eichhorn (1856–1926) and William Wrede (1859–1906), and consisted of students Hermann Gunkel (1862–1932), Heinrich Hackmann (1864–1935), Alfred Rahlfs (1865–1935), and Johannes Weiss (1863–1914). Later additions included Wilhelm Bousset (1865–1920), Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923), and Wilhelm Heitmüller (1869–1926). Their uncompromising concern with approaching early Christian texts in a strictly historical vein and irrespective of dogmatic pressures quickly won them the reproach of being radicals. How their “radicality” affected their students can be seen in the following letter from an eyewitness:

At the beginning of my student days Wilhelm [Lueken] took me for a walk to Rohns [near Göttingen] and told me on the way that Strauß’s *Life of Jesus* was really tame, and that nowadays people went much farther. I was at a loss for words. The people around Bousset seemed to me like a horde of iconoclasts who wanted to smash everything to pieces…. Just as Darwin’s creation has no Creator, Bousset’s Bible has no Holy Spirit. It was in fact all a human construct—and moreover stank of forgeries.

**Exegetical Principles of the History of Religions School**

Looking back on the numerous works of the HRS members, one may raise potentially fruitful questions, with reference to four domains or approaches: radical-historical, comparative, sociological, and psychological.

**The Radical-Historical Approach**

“*Religionsgeschichtlich*” means, first of all, that religion as such is to be studied using a radically historical methodology. In this the HRS furthers the investigative work maintained since the Enlightenment—not without personal cost—by scholars inside and outside theology such as Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768), Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781) and Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860). They brought the historical question once again to a climax and were willing “to fight to the bitter end over the
foundations of historical research.” Thus, for example, a fundamental question was handed down from Hugo Greßmann to Albert Eichhorn, the real founder of the HRS: Had Jesus’ body in fact been raised following his death?

The radical historical approach that emerged from this was reflected as well in William Wrede’s book *The Messianic Secret,* which takes as its point of departure the question of “whether Jesus understood himself to be the Messiah and presented himself as such.” Wrede explains the Markan contradiction between Jesus’ repeated instructions to keep his Messiahship quiet and the frequent allusion to his divinity by both demons and disciples by hypothesizing that the Messianic secret was a dogmatic compromise between the Messianic belief of the earliest Christian community and the patently “unmessianic” life of Jesus. And Wrede anticipates the objection to this theory from the outset of his work: “We cannot alter the Gospels; we must take them as they are. If my critique is seen as radical, I have nothing against that. I maintain that matters themselves are sometimes radical to the utmost degree, and that it can hardly be reproachable to call them as they are.”

In a fashion similar to Wrede, Johannes Weiß’s radical historical approach underscores how much Jesus’ proclamation was primarily aimed at the future. Weiß was concerned that the contemporary view of Protestantism—the Kingdom as cultural power in the present—was wholly different from Jesus’ idea of the Kingdom of God. Jesus had not seen himself as the founder or basis of God’s Kingdom, but rather had expected that the latter would be in-breaking by means of an impending divine intervention.

*Comparative Religion*

The second thrust of the HRS’s research concerns comparative religion; in fact, in this context, “religionsgeschichtlich” means comparative religion. This development may be seen against the background of the successful, explosive expansion, since the end of the eighteenth century, of the knowledge of sources in the area of classical philology and Oriental Studies. As a result of this unexpected broadening of the field, a comparative perspective on religions was essentially obligatory. Throughout this time, the quiet influence of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) continued to resonate.

Thereafter, the history of religion experienced an upswing through the speculative philosophy of religion of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). His grandiose attempt to co-ordinate the many facets of religion into one religious development consisting of the progressive consciousness of God (the Absolute) in the human psyche had also awakened interest in apparently foreign religions and thus built a basis for their comparison with Christianity. In close connection to the flourishing field of comparative linguistics, Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900) laid the groundwork for a science of religion. Max Müller attached his own work to natural theology, which in his view was the greatest
The Sociological Question

The third focus of the HRS deals with its employment of sociological elements as a way to understand early Christianity more accurately. HRS representatives of this interest identified popular piety as well as cultic practices as witnesses to religious tradition. Thus Bousset looked on apocalyptic material—for example, the picture of the Antichrist—as images of popular piety, and reckoned that they were handed down over centuries. Similarly, Gunkel, in his writing on the religionsgeschichtlich problem of the New Testament, described the history of such materials as the descent into Hell, the resurrection of Christ, and the Book of Seven Seals—as well as their absorption by earliest Christianity. These and other elements of early Christian doctrine and praxis prompted the reconstruction of a pre-Pauline Hellenistic Christ-cult and the hypothesis that the Apostle to the Gentiles had been greatly influenced by the Hellenistic Christian community.

Another noteworthy feature of this approach was that reports and actual courses of events were no longer assessed equally, as had commonly been the case in the earlier source-critical research; instead, a radical distinction was introduced between literary form and historical occurrence. Following the acknowledgment of the depth-dimension of history, a “happening” was no longer seen as a chain of acts capable of being described by witnesses, but rather as a constellation of conditions, customs, practices, norms and institutions. “Formgeschichte” as evoked by the HRS thus contained a sociological element. One may in fact wish to speak here of a paradigm shift with respect to the source-critical school of the earlier historicism, in view of the link between individual structure and social condition.
The Psychological Question

A fourth and final aspect of the HRS method has to do with the discovery of original Christian belief as a phenomenon to be understood psychologically. In concrete terms, the members of the group turned away from a general theory of dogmatics and toward an emphasis on the primacy of experience. According to Hermann Gunkel, the earliest Christians present us not so much with specific teachings about the Holy Spirit as with a number of depictions of its workings.25 “Spirit” thus designates a primary phenomenon, to be counted among the original Christian community’s inexplicable powerful moments—as well as its glossolalia, ecstasy and healings. Such a view of the Spirit and its effects was not specifically early-Christian; indeed, it permeated the entire Old Testament, was never completely foreign to ancient Judaism, and could be attributed as well to Greek understanding. “We therefore have the right to call this the popular view of New Testament times.”26

Gunkel came to believe that he had recovered the original Christian religion, a formulation that subsequent theologizing had overshadowed. He identified religion as a historical-psychological phenomenon, the immediate experience of a foreign being or power not to be compared with an “I.” This view of religion was to be distinguished from teaching or speculation about the Spirit. Clearly, of course, this psychological interpretation of religion would sooner or later chafe against Gunkel’s own piety and that of other historians of religion who claimed or wished to be Church theologians.

First, Gunkel quietly developed another concept of religion by equating it with morality—a theme he found both in the Sermon on the Mount and the hymns of Paul Gerhardt (1607–1676). He noted, for example, that ecstatic spirituality and morally understood religion are not identical, for the essential teachings of the Sermon on the Mount do not invoke the Spirit; and Paul Gerhardt was hardly an enthusiast.27 The reason for this re-characterization of religion from psychology to morality is rooted in the indelible impression made by the historical Jesus: because of the force of his personal impact, Christianity did not forfeit its historical-moral character, and his core teachings made possible the survival of Christianity. Still, these remarks are not central to Gunkel’s work, but serve in a conciliatory way to guard against the impression that the early church consisted of an assemblage of variously inspired members whose main identifying trait was an exalted, half-disturbed agitation.

Second, both contemporaries of the HRS and established representative theologians expressed sharp criticism of a purely psychological treatment of the religious concept. Indeed, while he gave crucial support to the academic careers of the members of the HRS, Adolf von Harnack found this sort of research a source of considerable discomfort. Were he himself engaged in such an enterprise, he avowed, it would bring on “immediate physical ills.”28 For Harnack, logos was stronger than either mythos or sacrament in the history of Christianity; and “the history of theology and moral life remains that
of confessed faith and living Christianity—these most prominent aspects of
church-history.”

At the same time, this criticism evinces a decided weakness in Harnack’s New
Protestantism—specifically where it is linked to the postulate of a reigning
self-consciousness. Psychoanalysis in theology, as initiated by the HRS, opened
up new avenues into the world of religion. Harnack and his students were
unaware that they were flying in the face of psychic realities. In other words, it
was the HRS that initially discovered the depth dimension of religion and
infused a sort of psychoanalysis into theology by summarily introducing it as a
legitimate element of historical reconstruction.

Biblical Studies as Part of the Scientific Study of Religion?

What importance does my study of the HRS have for today’s toilers in the
scholarly vineyard? I offer the following tentative answers.

Only a single, unitary science can be dedicated to the study of religions of the
past and present. All efforts to diminish strictly scientific research in this area,
or to “pluralize” it, are exposed to the suspicion of not taking the scientific task
seriously. Personal beliefs must not be allowed to influence science; nor can
scholars be allowed to misuse research into non-Christian religions in an attempt
to demonstrate their imperfections. Finally, all mention of “understanding”
must be stricken from the scientific study of religion, for this amounts to faith-
based, revelation-theology.

Theology can be a scholarly discipline only when it observes the intellectual
protocols of the modern university and bids farewell to deductive epistemolog-
ical principles of any kind—including the notion of revealed truth and any
claims to privileged knowledge of God. Theology becomes a valid academic dis-
cipline only insofar as it employs the historical-critical method’s three presup-
positions of causality, the potential validity of analogies, and the reciprocal
relationship between historical phenomena. Admittedly, such an adoption of
the non-theistic methodology of secularism demands that traditional religion
undergo a Copernican revolution.

However it may “disenchant” the world, true objectivity means relinquishing
the canonicity or sacredness of particular writings, any claims to a “revelation,”
and all distinctions between orthodoxy and heresy except as a subject of histori-
cal discourse. This same even-handedness outlaws dogmatic and theological
judgments unsupported by empirical evidence, and refuses to deal with questions
of religious “truth” except to compare different truth claims. The scholar of reli-
gion must steer clear of ideologies, and is obliged to use the methods and insights
of the sciences and humanities, including those derived from such related disci-
plines as sociology, psychology and ethnology, for their illumination of histori-
cal phenomena is often decisive. His or her assumptions and conclusions must
remain open to peer review and revision on the sole basis of best evidence.
Accordingly, a scientific study of Christian origins cannot occupy itself with the assessment of miracles as religious phenomena per se. One might, of course, hear in this context the objection that every historiography has its presuppositions. This oft-encountered salvo, that conveniently allows theologians to presuppose God intervenes in the course of the history (and especially New Testament history) is quite simply outrageous. Of course all historiography has a subjective colouring. But to this observation we reasonably counter that awareness of potential subjectivity does not preclude engaging in research that is as objective as possible. Recognizing the fact of human subjectivity can hardly justify what would amount to invoking along the way an unscientific *deus ex machina*.

It is sometimes proposed that anyone who investigates the New Testament and the history of the Church ought by rights to be a believer. But such a demand flies in the face of the historical record. The historian who places his or her dogmatic thumb on the scales forfeits the right to claim a valid critique—that is, an opus that seeks above all to investigate, discover, detect and explain. The condemnations of early Christian bishops and teachers based on particular dogmatic criteria represent an *ex post facto* tinkering akin to the attempt of a modern physician to cure ancient Greeks and Romans of the illnesses from which they died. Such frivolous scholarship is a travesty of the genuine historical research that does justice to its subject by employing intrinsic categories of judgment rather than criteria derived from speculative doctrines.

And while scholarship lives in and by its methods, these methods neither circumscribe it nor give it its value. For there are good and bad methods, and only the critical ones are good—especially those that provide peer evaluation and self-criticism. No universally valid method is appropriate in every case; indeed, such an expectation would approach the material under investigation with a prior assumption. Any valid search necessarily grows out of the material itself and constantly checks whether it is doing justice to that material. Moreover, as the Greek etymology of the word “method,” *met-hodos* (after the way/course) should remind us, methodological reflection always follows methods that work organically.

All our lives we must fight against a reluctance to return to original sources. Nothing is so paralyzing for historical criticism as the search for solutions to historical problems outside the historical context. The only valid methodological principle is to infer the unknown from the known, to begin with well-established facts and from there to find one's way back to what is less certain.

Thus, my concept of the scientific study of the New Testament results in the requirement that an understanding of the history of Early Christianity be pursued in purely secular terms—or as the term “profane” suggests, by adopting a method deconsecrated and purged of all special ecclesiastical and theological regulation and privileging of knowledge.

In a similar vein, the members of the HRS—for whom history became the foundational element of their criticism—through an intensive study of texts
developed critical principles that must be part of modern studies of religion. Their occasional “taming” of historical facts in order to be able to remain Christians is understandable yet not convincing. Fortunately, however, it is only necessary to remove a thin layer of traditionalism from the solid rock of their scientific findings to cleanse the record of their pious equivocations.

It is my claim that the scholarly achievements of the HRS constitute an important benchmark: the true definition of “the scientific study of religion.” To be sure, they lacked a philosopher of religion who could develop a theory that would do justice to all their empirical findings.

Indeed, we are still waiting for such a philosopher today.

Notes

1 Gerd Lüdemann is the Founder and Director of the Archiv Religionsgeschichtliche Schule at Georg-August-University, Göttingen. He thanks Martha Cunningham for English assistance, chiefly in translating the work from which much of the material in this essay is drawn, his 1998 book Im Würgegriff der Kirche (In the Stranglehold of the Church), published by Verlag zu Klampen, Lüneburg.


would be a mistake to envisage a lexicon that would find a large clientele for your standpoint on the Church and ecclesiastical matters right now. I do not yet see us as ready yet for such a radical, anti-Church lexicon ... “ (Ibid.; letter of February 4, 1905, with original emphasis).


12 His main work on the Bible, *Apologie oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verhehrer Gottes*, in two volumes, was not published until 1972 (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag), edited by Gerhard Alexander.

13 After the death of Reimarus, Lessing published parts of the *Apologie*, under the title *Fragmente eines Ungenannten*, that continued to be relevant to the life-of-Jesus research right into the twentieth century.

14 Baur was the founder of a significant historical theology (see Ulrich Köpf, “Ferdinand Christian Baur als Begründer einer konsequent historischen Theologie,” *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 89 [1992]: 440–461). His three most renowned students were David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874), Eduard Zeller (1814–1908), and Albert Schwegler (1819–1857). The latter two made names for themselves particularly in the areas of Roman history (Schwegler) and Greek philosophical history (Zeller), but they were also responsible for important essays on early Christianity (cf. on Schwegler, G. Lüdemann, *Opposition to Paul in Jewish Christianity* [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1989], 7–9; translation by M.E. Boring of *Paulus der Heidenapostel*, vol. 2. *Antipaulinismus im frühen Christentum* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1983]; and on Zeller, G. Lüdemann, *Early Christianity according to the Traditions in Acts. A Commentary* [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1989], 2; translation by John Bowden of *Das frühe Christentum nach den Traditionen der Apostelgeschichte. Ein Kommentar* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1987]).


19 Ibid., 1.

20 Ibid., 2.


26 Ibid., 34.


29 Ibid.