THE EVOLUTION OF MORALS UNDER INDIRECT RECIPROCITY

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Abstract

We study the coexistence of strategies in the indirect reciprocity game where agents have access to second-order information. We fully characterize the evolutionary stable equilibria and analyze their comparative statics with respect to the cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs involving two strategies and one for higher CBR’s which involves two additional strategies. We thereby offer an explanation for the coexistence of different moral judgments among humans. Both equilibria require the presence of second-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for higher-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. In a laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of subjects play strategies that belong to the predicted equilibrium set. Furthermore, varying the CBR across treatments leads to changes in the distribution of strategies that are in line with theoretical predictions.

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1 Introduction

Several theories have been proposed to explain the evolution of cooperation among humans when cooperation generates a public benefit at a private cost. One of the different mechanisms to promote cooperation proposed in the literature is indirect reciprocity.\textsuperscript{1} Contrary to direct reciprocity, under indirect reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Alexander, 1987) a cooperative act is not reciprocated by the receiver of that act but by a third party. Promoting cooperation through this mechanism requires individuals to carry an observable reputation which informs other members of the society about their past behavior. To quote Alexander (1987): “indirect reciprocity is a consequence of direct reciprocity occurring in the presence of interested audiences.” This audience provides the public monitoring and the evaluation of individual behavior.

Indirect reciprocity is of particular importance for at least two reasons. First, it marks a benchmark as it is least demanding regarding the assortativity of the matching procedure determining the interaction of players to foster cooperation. It thereby offers an explanation for observed cooperative behavior among strangers. Second, it provides a rationale for the omnipresent transmission of information about the reputation of society’s members regarding their cooperativeness. Moreover, the concept of a societal reputation system offers an economic perspective on the role and characteristics of moral judgment in the realm of human cooperation.

The economic literature has established with quite some generality that community enforcement can sustain cooperation as a social norm in random matching games played by rational forward-looking agents (Kandori, 1992; Okuno-Fujiiwara and Postlewaite, 1995; Takahashi, 2010). Apart from this, and despite the theoretical appeal of indirect reciprocity and its potential importance for the initiation of cooperation among strangers, there is surprisingly little research in economics on this topic. Notable exceptions are the recent theoretical contributions by Berger (2011), Berger and Grüne (2016), and the experimental research by, for instance, Bolton et al. (2005), Seinen and Schram (2006), and Charness et al. (2011). Most research on indirect reciprocity has been conducted in the field of evolutionary biology. This literature is in the tradition of the seminal paper of Nowak and Sigmund (1998) and focuses on the identification of specific reputation mechanisms and its informational requirements for cooperation to evolve.\textsuperscript{2} In that research it is assumed that all members of a society obey the same reputation mechanism, i.e., all individuals share the same notion of what is considered to be good and what is bad.

\textsuperscript{1}For a survey, see Nowak (2006).
\textsuperscript{2}The most comprehensive study in this regard is Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2006).
behavior.\textsuperscript{3}

One main limitation of this approach is that it precludes the apparent heterogeneity of what agents consider to be good or bad behavior which in turn determines their inclination to help others. This is because of the analytic intractability of the extension of the model to multiple reputation mechanisms simultaneously at work. Apart from its intractability, the coexistence of different reputation mechanisms would make it difficult to provide a plausible story of information processing as each agent is required to carry multiple labels which constantly need to be collectively updated. This is because what some members of the society might consider to be good behavior might be bad from the perspective of others. Consequently, the apparent question regarding the selection of the reputation mechanism cannot be addressed. As another limitation we consider the introduced difficulties of generating testable hypotheses because strategies condition on subjects’ unobservable reputation. In contrast, our strategies condition on past behavior which is also observable by the econometrician or information about it that is even perfectly controllable by the experimenter.

In this paper we overcome these shortcomings and provide an analytically tractable model which allows the study of the coevolution of different inherited strategies. We obtain this by discarding the concept of a reputation mechanism in the form of an evaluating function which acts as an intermediary between a decision-maker’s current behavior and the opponent’s past behavior. Instead, we simply consider publicly available information about past behavior and strategies prescribing behavior conditional on this information. Since morals are only sustainable in the long run only if the prescribed behavior is (materially) not too disadvantageous, we can interpret our results as an analysis of the coevolution of morals under indirect reciprocity. There is some consensus in the literature that the provision of so-called second-order information, i.e., information not only about the partner’s past behavior but also about the action of the partner’s former partner, is necessary and sufficient for cooperation to evolve under indirect reciprocity (e.g., Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004).\textsuperscript{4} We therefore focus on strategies which may directly condition behavior on second-order information about past behavior.

Our contribution is threefold. First, we contribute to the theoretical literature on indirect reciprocity. We fully characterize the set of all evolutionary stable equilibria for

\textsuperscript{3}The only exception is a recent paper by Yamamoto et al. (2017) who study the coevolution of reputation mechanisms in an agent-based model.

\textsuperscript{4}See Berger (2011) for a qualification of this claim. He shows that with a tolerant scoring rule as a reputation mechanism cooperation can evolve without higher-order information.
the considered class of strategies. Quite surprisingly, there are only two stable cooperative equilibria in the 15-dimensional population state space. Both are characterized by the coexistence of different morals and the presence of second-order discriminators. This reemphasizes the importance of second-order information. The two cooperative equilibria: (1) a single population state with two strategies, and (2) a linear equilibrium set with two additional strategies, emphasize the role of a particular second-order strategy. The implicit moral of that strategy matches with the real-life societal judgment that not helping someone who was helpful before is a particular reprehensible behavior which ought to be punished. This also adds to the ongoing discussion about the minimal informational requirements for community enforcement to enable cooperation. In a recent and very rich paper Heller and Mohlin (2017) show, among others, that in a related environment a single observation about the opponent’s past behavior may sustain cooperation. In their setting the observations are drawn randomly from the entire history of the partner. Thus, “[.] memory of past interactions is assumed to be long and accurate but dispersed.” In our setting, community enforcement relies on information of a higher order but only the last informational update needs to be remembered.

Second, we add to the experimental literature on indirect reciprocity or, more general, to experiments on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with stranger matching. We conducted a laboratory experiment to test (i) whether elicited strategies correspond to the equilibrium strategies predicted by our theory, and (ii) whether comparisons across treatments correspond to the theoretically predicted comparative statics with respect to the cost-benefit ratio (CBR). We run two treatments which differ in their CBR. It turns out that more than 75% of the participants use one of the four strategies predicted by our theory. Moreover, differences in the composition of strategies across treatments are in line with the theory’s comparative statics. We consider the coherence between theoretical predictions and experimental evidence to be the strongest current support for the empirical relevance of indirect reciprocity as a mechanism to promote cooperation.

Third, from a broader perspective we contribute to the literature which explores the evolutionary rationales for the existence of moral judgments guiding individual decision-making in such contexts (e.g., Bergstrom, 2009; Alger and Weibull, 2013). Alger and Weibull (2013) show in a very general setting that when individuals’ preferences are their private information, a particular convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as being evolutionarily stable. This combination, called homo hamiltonensis, which mirrors the degree of assortativity, is the unique evolutionary stable type. The authors mention that “[t]he uniqueness hypothesis is made for technical reasons, and it seems
that it could be relaxed somewhat, but at a high price in analytical complexity.” In this regard, our analytically tractable model provides a rationale for the coexistence of different morals for the specific case of the helping game.

2 Theory

2.1 The Model

Consider a large population of infinitely-lived individuals. For each integer round \( t = 1, 2, \ldots \), each player randomly finds an opponent and engages in the donation game. That is, in these pairwise encounters, one of the individuals is randomly assigned to the role of the mover, the other person is the receiver. Assume that the assignment of opponents excludes direct reciprocity. In the pairwise game, the mover can either keep (defect, D) or give (cooperate, C). In the latter case, the payoff to the mover is \(-c\), whereas the receiver gets \(b\), where \(b>c>0\). In the former both players receive a payoff of 0. We will make the usual assumption that each individual actually plays in both roles at the same time during an interaction.

We assume that each player at time \( t \) carries (second-order) information about her chosen action in the last period \( t-1 \) and about the opponent’s action at \( t-2 \). Labeling keep by D and give by C gives four different labels on which subjects can condition their behavior. The label CD, for instance, reveals that the considered player cooperated in \( t-1 \), while this player’s partner defected at \( t-2 \). Thus, there are \(2^4=16\) strategies assigning C or D to each of the labels. We will identify the set of strategies \( S \) by \(\{0,1\}^4\), where the first/second/third/last element specifies the behavior for the label \(CC/CD/DC/DD\), and 1(0) indicates \(C(D)\). Thus, for example, the strategy which gives in the case of the label CD and keeps otherwise is coded as \((0,1,0,0)\).

Let \(x_s\) denote the share of players applying strategy \(s\), and let \(p_s|XY, X,Y \in \{C,D\}\) denote the probability that an individual playing strategy \(s\) cooperates when facing an opponent with the label \(XY\). In the absence of perceptional or execution errors these label-contingent probabilities are either 0 or 1. For example, the strategy \(s\) which cooperates with an individual showing histories \(CC/CD/DC/DD\), but defects toward opponents with a \(DD\)-label gives rise to \(p_s|CC=p_s|CD=p_s|DC=1 \text{ and } p_s|DD=0\).

We will incorporate two types of errors. First, we will consider execution errors \((\gamma)\), i.e., individuals defect although they intended to help. We will not consider errors of the type of unintended help. Second, we will allow for perceptional errors \((\epsilon)\), i.e., individuals may misperceive the actual label of an opponent. More precisely, we will assume that any label
$XY$ can be misperceived with equal probability $\frac{\epsilon}{3}$ like any other label. We will assume that individual errors are independent across time and individuals. Let $1_s(XY) \in \{0, 1\}$ denote the indicator function which equals 1 if strategies $s$ implies cooperation given an opponents’ label $XY$. We then can express $p_{s|XY}$, the probability of cooperating for strategy $s$ conditional on the receiver’s label, by:

$$p_{s|XY} = (1_s(XY)(1-\epsilon) + \sum_{X'Y' \neq XY} 1_s(X'Y')\frac{\epsilon}{3})(1-\gamma) \quad (1)$$

Furthermore, let $p_{XY|s}(t)$, $X, Y \in \{C, D\}$ denote the probability at time $t$ that an individual playing strategy $s$ carries the label $XY$. Finally, let $p_{XY}(t)$, $X, Y \in \{C, D\}$ denote the share of the label $XY$ in the population at time $t$. We can then write $p_{XY|s}(t)$ as:

$$p_{CC|s}(t) = p_{s|CC}p_{CC}(t-1) + p_{s|CD}p_{CD}(t-1) \quad (2)$$

$$p_{CD|s}(t) = p_{s|DC}p_{DC}(t-1) + p_{s|DD}p_{DD}(t-1) \quad (3)$$

$$p_{DC|s}(t) = (1-p_{s|CC})p_{CC}(t-1) + (1-p_{s|CD})p_{CD}(t-1) \quad (4)$$

$$p_{DD|s}(t) = (1-p_{s|CC})p_{DC}(t-1) + (1-p_{s|CD})p_{DD}(t-1) \quad (5)$$

That is, for example, a player with strategy $i$ carries a $CC$ label if he cooperates with someone who carries a $CC$-label or a $CD$-label. Taken together with the identity:

$$p_{XY}(t) = \sum_{s \in S} x_s p_{XY|s}(t), \ X, Y \in \{C, D\} \quad (6)$$

this gives us the following recurrence for the distribution of labels in the population

$$(p_{CC}(t), p_{CD}(t), p_{DC}(t), p_{DD}(t))' = W(t)(p_{CC}(t-1), p_{CD}(t-1), p_{DC}(t-1), p_{DD}(t-1))' \quad (7)$$

, with transition matrix $(w(t))_{ij}^5$:

$$\begin{pmatrix}
\sum_{s \in S} x_s p_{s|CC} & \sum_{s \in S} x_s p_{s|CD} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \sum_{s \in S} x_s p_{s|DC} & \sum_{s \in S} x_s p_{s|DD} \\
1-\sum_{s \in S} x_s p_{s|CC} & 1-\sum_{s \in S} x_s p_{s|CD} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1-\sum_{s \in S} x_s p_{s|DC} & 1-\sum_{s \in S} x_s p_{s|DD}
\end{pmatrix} \quad (8)$$

$^5$Note that in the setting of Bolton et al (2005) only half the labels are updated each period. This, however, only slows down convergence.
We will assume that there are two different timescales. The adjustment of the shares $x_i$ is assumed to operate on a continuous time scale $\tau$ and to be slow compared to the dynamics of the distribution of labels. This mirrors the usual assumption that reputations dynamics are much faster than the adjustment of strategies (e.g., Berger, 2011). In other words, we treat reputation as instantly equilibrated when deriving the payoffs which determine the dynamics on the slow timescale. Under this assumption we can solve for the equilibrium distribution of labels $p_{XY}$ for a given distribution of strategies in the population. Analytic results for fixed population states near the evolutionary stable equilibria and simulation results for arbitrary states show, that for any initial distribution of labels after $3-4$ rounds the actual distribution of labels is very close to those given by (9) (see Appendix A.2 for details).

\[ p_{CD} = \frac{1}{2 + \frac{w_{12}}{1-w_{11}} + \frac{1-w_{23}}{w_{24}}} = p_{DC}, \quad p_{CC} = \frac{w_{12}}{1-w_{11}} p_{CD}, \quad p_{DD} = \frac{1-w_{23}}{w_{24}} p_{CD} \]  

We will make use of the equilibrium values given by (9) to calculate payoffs. Plugging in (9) into (5)-(8) gives us equilibrium strategy-contingent label probabilities $p_{XY|s}$. A mover's help depends on the label of his opponent and on the mover's inclination to cooperate given this label. Since the opponent is randomly chosen, her label follows the equilibrium distribution $p_{XY}$. Whether a receiver receives help depends on his label and, given his label, the inclination of all other strategies to help weighted by their share in the population of the particular strategy. Thus, the payoff for strategy $s$ at time $\tau$ in the label equilibrium (9) are given by:

\[ \Pi_s(\tau; b, c, \epsilon, \gamma) = b \sum_{s' \in S} x_{s'}(\tau) \cdot p_C(s', s) - c \cdot p_C(s) \]  

, where $p_C(s) = p_{s|CC} \cdot p_{CC} + p_{s|CD} \cdot p_{CD} + p_{s|DC} \cdot p_{DC} + p_{s|DD} \cdot p_{DD}$, and $p_C(s', s) = p_{s'|CC} \cdot p_{CC|s} + p_{s'|CD} \cdot p_{CD|s} + p_{s'|DC} \cdot p_{DC|s} + p_{s'|DD} \cdot p_{DD|s}$, i.e. $p_C(s)$ gives the probability that someone with strategy $s$ cooperates, and $p_C(s', s)$ corresponds to the probability that a $s'$-player will help a $s$-player.

### 2.2 Evolutionary Stable Equilibria

In this section we study the existence of stable equilibrium point or sets under the well-known replicator dynamics, i.e.,

\[ \dot{x}_s(\tau) = (\Pi_s(\tau; b, c, \epsilon, \gamma) - \Pi(\tau; b, c, \epsilon, \gamma)) \cdot x_s(\tau), \]
where \( \Pi(\tau; b, c, \epsilon, \gamma) = \sum_{s \in S} \Pi_s(\tau; b, c, \epsilon, \gamma) \cdot x_s(\tau) \) denotes the average payoff.

Since the equilibrium distribution of labels \( p_{XY} \) depends on the distribution of strategies the replicator dynamics yield a system of nonlinear differential equations. Note that the payoffs \( \Pi_i(\tau; b, c, \epsilon, \gamma) \) are linear in \( \frac{b}{c} \). Therefore, we can normalize \( b \equiv 1 \) and interpret \( c \in (0, 1) \) as the cost-benefit ratio, CBR, without changing the set of stable equilibria. We make the assumption that the two independent errors have the same magnitude, i.e., \( \eta \equiv \epsilon = \gamma \), which simplifies presentation and analysis. Thus, we analyze the dynamic system:

\[ \dot{x}_s(\tau) = (\Pi_s(\tau; c, \eta) - \Pi(\tau; c, \eta)) \cdot x_s(\tau). \]  

(12)

Given the 16 strategies there is a huge number of possible combinations which could form an equilibrium, ranging from a homomorphic population with just one strategy present to a fully mixed population where every strategy is played. The following Lemma will simplify the search for the equilibria substantially. In any stable equilibrium all involved strategies must earn the same payoffs otherwise the shares would adjust according to (12). Intuitively, payoff differences between strategies result from differences in the prescribed behavior for the four potential labels. Indeed, it turns out that payoff differences depend on the differences in behavior but not on the conditional behavior where different strategies agree. That is, for instance, \( \Pi_{(1,s_2,s_3,s_4)}(\tau; c, \eta) - \Pi_{(0,s_2,s_3,s_4)}(\tau; c, \eta) = \Pi_{(1,s_2',s_3',s_4')}(\tau; c, \eta) - \Pi_{(0,s_2',s_3',s_4')}(\tau; c, \eta) \) for all \( s,s' \in S \). As a consequence, any payoff difference can be decomposed into four basic payoff differences \( \Delta \Pi_i(\tau; c, \eta), i=1,...,4 \), where

\[ \Delta \Pi_1(\tau; c, \eta) = (1-\gamma) \left( (1-\epsilon) p_{CC} \sum_{\tilde{s}} x_{\tilde{s}}(\tau) p_{\tilde{s}|CC} + \ldots + \frac{\epsilon}{3} p_{DD} \sum_{\tilde{s}} x_{\tilde{s}}(\tau) p_{\tilde{s}|DD} \right) - c \left( (1-\epsilon) p_{CC} + \frac{\epsilon}{3} p_{CD} + \frac{\epsilon}{3} p_{DC} + \frac{\epsilon}{3} p_{DD} \right) \]  

(13)

\( \Delta \Pi_2(\tau; c, \eta), \Delta \Pi_3(\tau; c, \eta), \Delta \Pi_4(\tau; c, \eta) \) are defined analogously. In other words, each of the four basic payoff differences correspond to the payoff difference of two strategies which differ in the prescribed action for exactly one of the four labels, \( CC, CD, DC, \) and \( DD \). The following Lemma provides the formal statement.

**Lemma** Let \( s, s' \in \{0,1\}^4 \) then \( \Pi_s(\tau; c, \eta) - \Pi_{s'}(\tau; c, \eta) = \sum_{i=1}^4 (s_i - s'_i) \Delta \Pi_i(\tau; c, \eta) \)

**Proof.** All proofs are given in Appendix A.1. 

Note that a payoff difference of zero for two strategies does not *a priori* imply that the
involved basic differences are also zero. However, stability indeed causes this implication. Intuitively, if two strategies earn the same payoff but two or more involved basic differences are not zero then there exists a mutant strategy which could successfully invade this population. This mutant strategy adopts the advantageous aspect and drops the disadvantageous one. Thus, in any stable equilibrium the basic differences for the label where the equilibrium strategies disagree on the prescribed behavior for a given label must be zero.

Given the four basic differences there are five \((k=0, 1, 2, 3, 4)\) categories of equilibria ranging from none of the basic differences being zero to all being zero. Within each of the categories there are \(\binom{4}{k}\) classes of equilibria which correspond to the number of possible combinations among the four basic differences. Finally, each class contains \(2^{4-k}\) subclasses of equilibria which correspond to the number of possible assignments (C or D) for each of the labels with a non-zero basic payoff difference. For instance, for the category with two basic differences being zero \((k=2)\) there are \(\binom{4}{2}=6\) classes and \(2^2=4\) subclasses (see Table 1). In total, this gives us 81 subclasses. Each of these subclasses may contain at least one stable equilibrium where multiplicity may result from non-linearities in the payoffs. However, under the restriction for the equilibria to be well-defined, i.e., to be elements of \(\Delta_{15}\) Table 1 informs us that there are indeed only 30 potentially stable equilibria.

It turns out that only four of the remaining 30 equilibria can be stable since for all other cases there exists a non-equilibrium strategy which earns strictly higher payoffs. Thus, such equilibria can successfully be invaded and are therefore not stable. Among the four remaining candidates are a homomorphic population with \(x_{0,0,0,0}=1\) and an equilibrium with \(x_{1,1,1,1}+x_{1,1,0,1}=1\). The former corresponds to a population state where everybody unconditionally defects. The latter is characterized by the coexistence of unconditional cooperators and conditional cooperators who intentionally defect if and only if the label DC is observed. That is, if they encounter a receiver who did not help someone who helped in the previous period. Thus, this strategy makes use of second-order information.

Moreover, there is the equilibrium constituted by the strategies \((1, 1, 1, 1)\), \((1, 1, 1, 0)\), \((1, 1, 0, 1)\), and \((1, 1, 0, 0)\) which is indeed a linear equilibrium set of dimension one which is based on three equations \(\Delta \Pi_i(t; c, \eta)=0, i=3, 4, \) and \(x_{1,1,1,1}+x_{1,1,0,1}+x_{1,1,0,0}+x_{1,0,0,0}=1\) and four unknown. The first of the two additional strategies \((1, 1, 1, 0)\) prescribes defection if and only if the label DD is observed by the mover. The second strategy only makes use of first-order information as it induces defection whenever the receiver previously defected. Finally, there is an equilibrium where all four basic differences vanish. Again, this is an equilibrium set which may contain all 16 strategies, i.e., fully mixed population states.
We are interested in two things. First, we want to determine whether the respective equilibrium is stable. Second, in the case of stability we want to derive the set of parameters \((\xi, \eta)\) such that the equilibrium under consideration is stable. We consider stability first and then turn to the set of parameters. The equilibrium \(x_{0,0,0,0}=1\) is stable since in this population state the strategy \((0,0,0)\) earns strictly higher payoffs than any other strategy. The equilibrium which involves the two strategies \(x_{1,1,1,1}\) and \(x_{1,1,0,1}\) is stable if and only if the non-zero basic payoff differences favor these strategies, i.e., \(\Delta \Pi_i(\tau; c, \eta) > 0, \forall i \neq 3\). Sufficiency results from the fact that an increase in the share \(x_{1,1,1,1}\) decreases the profit for strategy \((1,1,1,1)\) relative to \((1,1,0,1)\). The conditions \(\Delta \Pi_i(\tau; c, \eta) > 0, \forall i \neq 3\) imply that any strategy which deviates from the behavior where both equilibrium strategies agree (labels \(CC, CD,\) and \(DD\)) will earn a strictly lower payoff. Taken together, this ensures that any small perturbations will eventually vanish and equilibrium will be restored.

The one-dimensional equilibrium set with strategies \((1,1,1,1), (1,1,1,0), (1,1,0,1),\)
and \((1, 1, 0, 0)\) is stable if and only if the non-zero basic payoff differences favor these strategies, i.e., \(\Delta \Pi_i(\tau; c, \eta) > 0, i = 1, 2\). The sufficiency of this condition results from the fact that under this condition all non-zero eigenvalues of the matrix of the associated linear system have strictly negative real parts. Furthermore, the unique eigenvalue of zero is associated with the eigenvector spanning the equilibrium set. The second set is a 12-dimensional subset of \(\Delta_{15}\) which makes it analytically intractable. However, we can show that the equilibrium set contains an unstable region such that a neutral drift will eventually shift the population state into that region. Thus, this equilibrium is unstable.

Taken together, our evolutionary analysis revealed a remarkably small set of only two stable cooperative equilibria. Moreover, these equilibria have a simple structure, involving only a small set of strategies which, as we see below, cannot coexist, i.e., for each CBR allowing cooperation to emerge there is a unique cooperative equilibrium. The following Proposition summarizes these insights.

**Proposition** In the indirect reciprocity game there exist three stable equilibria:

\(E_1\): \(\{x \in \Delta_{15} \mid x_{(0,0,0,0)} = 1\}\) is stable for all \(\frac{c}{b} \in (0, 1)\).

\(E_2\): \(\{x \in \Delta_{15} \mid x_{(1,1,1,0)} = 1, x_{(1,1,1,1)} = 1 - \frac{3(1-c)}{2\eta} + \frac{3c}{2\eta} \sqrt{1 + \frac{1}{c^2} + \frac{2\eta(2+\tau(3-4\eta))}{c(1-\eta)^2(3-4\eta)}}\}\) is stable if and only if \(\frac{c}{b} \in (0, \frac{3-10\eta+8\eta^2}{15-22\eta+8\eta^2})\).

\(E_3\): \(\{x \in \Delta_{15} \mid \sum_{s \in S^1} x_s = 1, x_{(1,1,1,0)} = \alpha - x_{(1,1,1,1)}, x_{(1,1,0,1)} = \beta - x_{(1,1,1,1)}\}\) is stable if and only if \(\frac{c}{b} \in \left(\frac{3-10\eta+8\eta^2}{15-22\eta+8\eta^2}, \frac{3-10\eta+8\eta^2}{6-4\eta}\right)\), and \(\eta(1+2\eta)\frac{3-5\eta+2\eta^2}{3-5\eta+2\eta^2} < x_{(1,1,1,1)} < 1 + \frac{4}{3-4\eta} - \frac{8}{3-2\eta} + \frac{3c(5-4\eta)}{(3-4\eta)^2(1-\eta)},\)

where \(\alpha \equiv 1 + \frac{4}{3-4\eta} - \frac{8}{3-2\eta} + \frac{3(5-4\eta)c}{(3-4\eta)^2(1-\eta)}, \beta \equiv 1 + \frac{3}{1-\eta} - \frac{4}{3-4\eta} - \frac{4}{3-2\eta} - \frac{3(5-4\eta)c}{(3-4\eta)^2(1-\eta)},\) and

\(S^1 = \{x_{(1,1,1,1)}, x_{(1,1,1,0)}, x_{(1,1,0,1)}, x_{(1,1,0,0)}\}\).

Before we discuss the composition and the involved equilibrium behavior in more detail we turn to the set of parameters \((\frac{c}{b}, \eta)\) satisfying the necessary and sufficient conditions for stability presented in the proposition above. The parameter regions for each of the cooperative equilibria are depicted in Figure 1. As revealed in Figure 1 equilibrium (2) is stable for low cost-benefit ratios and equilibrium (3) for intermediate levels. Figure 1 also shows that the considered errors in perception and implementation limit the range of cost-benefit ratios for which cooperation may be sustained. Intuitively, if the chance of unintended defection increases cooperators are also more often punished because of the presence of discriminators. As a consequence, cooperation earns less and the population state may evolve toward full defection.
The following corollary characterizes the equilibria of the proposition in terms of the prescribed behavior and comparative statics. The comparative statics for equilibrium $E_2$ are derived via the derivatives of the equilibrium population state with respect to the model parameters. For the linear equilibrium set $E_3$ we can analyze the comparative statics by focusing on the boundaries of this set. It turns out that if the cost-benefit ratio increases the equilibrium set is shifted such that the share of the second-order discriminators playing $(1, 1, 0, 1)$ decreases whereas all other shares increase (see Figure 2).\footnote{For this equilibrium set the lower (upper) bound for the share of the unconditional cooperators is given by $\eta \left( \frac{1 + 2\eta}{3 - 5\eta + 2\eta} \right) \left( 1 + \frac{4}{3 - 4\eta} - \frac{8}{3 - 2\eta} + \frac{3c(5 - 4\eta)}{(3 - 4\eta)^2(1 - \eta)} \right)$. Hence, the $x_{(1,1,1,1)}$-coordinate of the boundaries of equilibrium set $E_3$ increases in $c$ and $\eta$.} The same comparative statics result for the error $\eta$.

**Corollary**

1. In $E_1$ everybody always defects, irrespective of the opponent’s label.

2. In $E_2$ some players are unconditional cooperators and some defect if and only if the receiver’s label is DC. The share of unconditional cooperators decreases in the cost-benefit ratio $c/b$ and the error $\eta$.

3. In $E_3$ all players cooperate in the case of label CC or CD. In the case of the opponents with labels DC or DD some cooperate, others defect. The shares of unco-
ditional cooperators, first-order discriminators increase and (1, 1, 1, 0)-second-order discriminators increase whereas the share of (1, 1, 0, 1)-second-order discriminators decreases in the cost-benefit ratio c/b and the error η.

The corollary emphasizes three interesting characteristics of the cooperative equilibria. First, they are consistent with the presence of unconditional cooperators. Second, stability requires the presence of second-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for second-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Third, the strategy \(x_{1,1,0,1}\) reminds one of the well-studied reputation dynamics called standing which always credits a sender with a good reputation except for the case in which help was refused to a receiver with a good reputation (e.g., Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2007). More surprising is the prediction of the strategy \((1, 1, 1, 0)\) which at first glance might be perceived as rather unreasonable behavior. This strategy is, however, internally consistent as it prescribes some sort of forgiving by helping when the partner did not previously help. The refusal of help when facing label DD could be interpreted as the intention to induce forgiving among other players. The remarkable small set of stable equilibria and their simple structure merits some detailed reflection upon the characteristics of the involved strategies.

Under the smallest errors of perception and implementation unconditional cooperation uniquely maximizes the number of cooperative acts and is therefore the efficient behavior. A homomorphic population of unconditional cooperators is, however, vulnerable to the invasion of defectors who have a relative advantage if cooperation is non-discriminatory. Importantly, the defectors will primarily receive the label DC as most of the time they interact with formerly cooperative individuals. Thus, in order to discipline such defectors and prevent an invasion unconditional cooperators need to be safeguarded by discriminating cooperators. These individuals are indeed second-order discriminators who refuse to help if and only if they are matched with a person with a DC reputation. The required share, \(x_{(1,1,0,1)}\), increases as cooperation becomes relatively more costly, i.e., as CBR increases. This is because a higher share \(x_{(1,1,0,1)}\) increases the likelihood of defectors getting punished and this compensates for the relative disadvantage of cooperators as a result of a higher CBR. Now, if the CBR further increases defection on cooperative behavior eventually turns profitable. To circumvent this, punishment needs to be intensified. Since defectors are relatively more likely to generate the DD reputation the second-order discriminator strategy \(x_{(1,1,1,0)}\) becomes an equilibrium strategy to back up cooperation. As a consequence of our lemma this also introduces the first-order discriminator strategy \(x_{(1,1,0,0)}\) (see Figure 1). Finally, defection when facing the label CD can
never be part of a cooperative equilibrium strategy. Intuitively, defection conditional on the label $CD$ does not punish defectors who primarily carry labels $DC$ and $DD$ but only the cooperators predominantly carrying labels $CC$ and $CD$. Thus, such behavior cannot stabilize cooperation.

Each of the pairs of parameters depicted in Figure 1 corresponds to a particular equilibrium (set). Figure 2 illustrates the distribution over equilibrium strategies for each pair of parameters. For the equilibrium set $E_3$ this requires the selection of a particular population state. In this regard, Figure 2 focuses on the center of gravity for the linear equilibrium set $E_3$. In line with the corollary, Figure 2 reveals that in the region associated with equilibrium $E_2$ the share of second-order discriminators $x_{(1,1,0,1)}$ increases in the cost-benefit ratio. When this equilibrium ceases to exist the minimum level of unconditional cooperators which can be sustained by this equilibrium is reached. The emergence of another second-order strategy, $(1, 1, 1, 0)$, and of the first-order discriminator $(1, 1, 0, 0)$ increases in the cost-benefit ratio and partially substitutes $(1, 1, 0, 1)$. Additionally, Figure 2 indicates that the distribution of equilibrium strategies is fairly robust to errors in the perception of labels and the implementation of strategies.

![Figure 2: Left: Distribution of strategies in $E_2$ and $E_3$: black – $x_{(1,1,1,1)}$; white – $x_{(1,1,0,1)}$; light gray – $x_{(1,1,0,0)}$; dark gray – $x_{(1,1,1,0)}$. For $E_3$ the center of gravity is used as a representative. Right: Equilibria $E_2$ and $E_3$ in the 3-simplex for different cost-benefit ratios. The arrows indicate increasing cost-benefit ratios.](image)
3 Experiment

3.1 Design of the experiment

Subjects were assigned into groups of 12, with the group being assigned either a “low” or “high” cost of giving ($c=5\ ECU$, $10\ ECU$). The benefit of giving was always $b=25\ ECU$. Participants were matched in pairs within their own group over 11 periods. No two subjects were matched together more than once, and they were made aware of this in advance (perfect stranger matching).

In each period, participants were asked to choose between keeping or giving to their partner. If a mover gave then his payoff was $75$ ECU and that of the receiver was $40 + b$ ECU. If a mover kept then his payoff was $75 + c$ ECU and that of the receiver was $40$ ECU. The exchange rate was set at $1\ ECU = 0.10\ €$ and participants were additionally paid a $4\ €$ show-up fee.

In the first period, subjects were given no information about their partner. In the second period, they were told what their partner did last period (first-order information). In the third and subsequent periods, they were told what their partner did last period and what their partners’ partner did in the previous-to-last period (second-order information). We illustrated the game played and the meaning of the information given by representing participants on the screen as shown in Figure 3 for periods 3 to 11 (equivalent representations were shown for periods 1 and 2).

![Figure 3: Visual and written representation of the game from period 3 onwards.](image-url)
Furthermore, in order to emphasize the consequences of actions taken and help strategic thinking, participants were told, using the same representation, and between each period, what information would be given to their next partner about themselves in the following period.

Our experiment was inspired by Bolton et al. (2005) (“BKO”) but differs in a number of respects. BKO paid the sum of payoffs over all periods while we paid one period drawn at random. This allowed us to isolate decisions made in each period rather than inducing history dependence in the actions of participants. BKO told participants in each period whether they were movers or receivers while we assigned the role of mover or receiver ex-post: Both participants of a pair in a given period had to make a decision to give or to keep, but only one of them would see their decision implemented at the payment stage. This increased the amount of data collected (11 decision periods rather than 7). BKO used direct elicitation, i.e., participants only made decisions for actual labels faced in the experiment, while we combined both elicitation methods. We used the strategy method (Selten, 1967) in period 5 and period 11 in order to know what action would have been chosen for every potential reputational information. In these periods participants had to choose an action for all four possible labels they could encounter. If one of those periods was chosen for payment then participants were paid for the action the mover took with respect to the actual label of the receiver. This solves the issue whereby we do not know what strategy was played by many participants in BKO because most of them were not faced with the full range of reputational information. We use the strategy method only in two periods, while other periods are designed to give participants experience in playing the game, and thus inform their answers under the strategy method.

BKO told participants how many periods they would play while we did not inform participants of the number of periods in the experiment. This avoids the end-game effect, with reduced giving, that occurs in BKO. Unlike BKO, we did not tell movers about the choice made by their partner in previous periods, as this was shown to influence behavior while it was not taken into account by the theory we are testing in this paper.

Finally, BKO chose cost-benefit ratios $c/b=1/5$ and $c/b=3/5$ while we chose ratio $c/b=1/5$ and $c/b=2/5$. These values were chosen for several reasons. First, our model predicts $x_{0,0,0,0}=1$, that is, no giving, as the unique stable equilibrium for $c/b \geq 1/2$. The prediction for $c/b=3/5$ is therefore straightforward and of little interest for us. Indeed, we are mainly interested in CBR that are consistent with the emergence of cooperative equilibria, and we focus on the type of strategies that sustain such equilibria. We chose $c/b=1/5$ to allow a direct comparison with the results in BKO. For $c/b=1/5$ our model predicts $E_3$ to be
the unique stable equilibrium. We will analyze whether observed strategies correspond to the predicted set of equilibrium strategies. We further test the comparative statics in our model by choosing another CBR, \( c/b = 2/5 \), that has the same equilibrium set prediction in terms of strategies employed, but differs in terms of the proportions of predicted strategies in the population.

**Procedure**

We ran our experiment in March 2017 at the Göttingen Laboratory of Behavioral Economics (GLOBE) in Göttingen. The experiment was computerized using the Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments (z-Tree; Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were recruited using the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE; Greiner, 2015). In accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, all participants were requested to read an online consent form and agree with its terms (by clicking) before registering to take part in an experiment.\(^7\) Participants were guaranteed the anonymity of the data generated during the experiment.\(^8\)

We ran 7 experimental sessions with 24 participants each, for a total of 168 participants. Each session had two groups of 12, one for each treatment. In total therefore, we observed 14 groups of 12 participants, that is, seven groups for each of the cost treatments. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 51, with a mean of 25. 44% were men, 94% German and 95% students, of which 45% studied economics. The experimental sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes and participants earned an average of 10.70€ (min = 8€, max = 12.50€). This payoff includes a 4€ base payment for showing up, as well as a payment proportional to individual payoff in one randomly selected period of the experiment.

**Payment**

We implemented some aspects of the PRINCE procedure (Johnson et al., 2015) by selecting in advance of each session the period and role that would be paid for each participant, and giving them this information on a piece of paper in a sealed envelope at the beginning of the experiment, to be opened only at its end.\(^9\) The period was drawn randomly, as was the role of each member of the pairs formed in that period. The sealed envelopes were labeled with a cabin number. Subjects drew an envelope at random when

\(^7\)Rules of the GLOBE are available at http://www.lab.wiwi.uni-goettingen.de/public/rules.php

\(^8\)The GLOBE’s privacy policy is available at http://www.lab.wiwi.uni-goettingen.de/public/privacy.php

\(^9\)The paper in the envelope told them “You are a (mover/recipient). The period that will be paid is period (number).”
entering the laboratory and went to the corresponding cabin. They were instructed not to open their envelope until we gave them the signal to do so. At the end of the experiment, and after we checked that each envelope was still closed, we gave participants the signal to open them. Subjects then had to input the information contained in their envelope on their computer. We checked this was done correctly before letting them proceed to the payment stage. At that stage, along with their payoff, movers were reminded of the action they had taken in the payment period and of the information that was available to them about their counterpart in that period. Receivers were informed in a similar way.

The advantage of this procedure was to emphasize that the assignment to a role and the choice of a payment period are not affected by a subject’s behavior during the experiment. It also emphasizes that any period may be relevant, and that the role played in that period is not known. Finally, this procedure makes it easy to explain to subjects in what role and in what period they will be paid: we inform them of this on the paper inside their closed envelope.

**Questionnaire** The experiment was followed by a socio-economic questionnaire, a modified cognitive-reflection test (Frederick, 2005), and questions about the participant’s experience and perception of the experiment. Translated instructions and a list of questions are shown in Appendix A.5.

### 3.2 Hypotheses

Our theoretical results lead to two testable predictions. Equilibrium set $E_3$ is the unique stable equilibrium for the cost-benefit ratios in both of our treatments (see Figure 1). We first test that the strategies used by participants correspond to those predicted by $E_3$:

**Hypothesis 1** In both treatments participants will employ one of the following strategies: $(1, 1, 1, 1)$, $(1, 1, 1, 0)$, $(1, 1, 0, 1)$, or $(1, 1, 0, 0)$.

This hypothesis means in particular that some participants will take account of second-order information in their choices, i.e., they will adopt different behavior when faced with labels DC and DD. We then test comparative statics within $E_3$ based on the Corollary (see Figure 2), by comparing the frequency of strategies across treatments.

**Hypothesis 2** The shares of unconditional cooperators $(1, 1, 1, 1)$, first-order discriminators $(1, 1, 0, 0)$, and $(1, 1, 1, 0)$-players will be higher in the high cost treatment than in the low cost treatment, while the share of $(1, 1, 0, 1)$-players will be lower.
3.3 Results

The structure of the presentation of the experimental results is as follows. First, we present summary statistics on directly elicited behavior and compare those with findings in BKO. In a second step we show the consistency of direct elicitation and the strategy method. Finally, we test our two hypotheses with data elicited from the strategy method.

3.3.1 Direct elicitation

Table 2 shows results from the direct elicitation method in terms of the percentage of giving depending on the label of the receiver. There was no label in the first period, labels were either C or D in the second period, and were either CC, CD, DC or DD in the third and later periods. We also show results from BKO for comparison, based on our own calculations with data provided by the authors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Treatments</th>
<th>BKO (own calculations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low cost</td>
<td>High cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c/b=1/5)</td>
<td>(c/b=2/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low cost</td>
<td>High cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c/b=1/5)</td>
<td>(c/b=3/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>74% (84)</td>
<td>67% (84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>81% (16)</td>
<td>63% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>90% (62)</td>
<td>79% (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85% (13)</td>
<td>70% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>68% (22)</td>
<td>57% (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33% (3)</td>
<td>33% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>85% (84)</td>
<td>71% (84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75% (16)</td>
<td>56% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periods 3–4 and 6–10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>86% (390)</td>
<td>82% (312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91% (162)</td>
<td>66% (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>85% (68)</td>
<td>69% (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77% (13)</td>
<td>50% (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>47% (60)</td>
<td>47% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50% (10)</td>
<td>26% (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>49% (70)</td>
<td>40% (124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71% (7)</td>
<td>31% (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>78% (588)</td>
<td>67% (588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88% (192)</td>
<td>43% (192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall average</td>
<td>78% (756)</td>
<td>68% (756)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86% (224)</td>
<td>46% (224)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Giving by treatment and image score, direct elicitation method. Number of observations in parentheses.

Table 2 highlights that irrespective of the receiver’s reputation, the average giving rates are generally higher in the low cost treatment than in the high cost treatment. We note that low overall cooperation rates in the high cost treatment c/b=3/5 of BKO are consistent with the predictions of our model, whereby cooperation breaks down at such high cost levels. The giving rates in the low cost treatment when faced with label CC are consistent with those in BKO’s low cost treatment, which used the same cost-benefit
ratio. Other giving rates are difficult to meaningfully compare given the low number of observations in BKO.

We observe as in BKO that label $CC$ is dominant in the low cost treatment (66% of observations in our experiment vs. 84% of observations in BKO). As in BKO, the increase in the cost-benefit ratio leads to a wider variety of labels being found in the population, whereby label $CC$ accounts for only 53% of observations in our high cost treatment ($c/b=2/5$), and 29% of observations in BKO’s high cost treatment ($c/b=3/5$).

With respect to the dynamics of the label distribution we observe a fast convergence to a stable distribution of labels in both treatments which warrants the corresponding assumption in our theoretical analysis (see Figure 4, Appendix A.3).

### 3.3.2 Strategy method vs. direct elicitation

From a review of literature comparing the two methods (Brandts and Charness, 2011), we expect broad agreement in the statistics elicited under the strategy method and the direct elicitation method. Given initial learning and the limitations in both the number of individual observations and in the variation in receivers’ labels, particularly in the low cost treatment, there is no meaningful test of consistency of methods on an individual level. We therefore assess differences between elicitation methods by comparing aggregate rates of giving by label under the strategy method (Table 3) with those elicited using the direct elicitation method (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Period 5 Low cost ($c/b=1/5$)</th>
<th>Period 5 High cost ($c/b=2/5$)</th>
<th>Period 11 Low cost ($c/b=1/5$)</th>
<th>Period 11 High cost ($c/b=2/5$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$CC$</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CD$</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$DC$</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$DD$</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Giving by treatment and image score, strategy method (N=84 in each cell).

We do find that giving rates as a function of labels are not significantly different between the strategy method and direct elicitation. The largest difference is in giving rates when faced with label $CD$ in the high cost treatment, which are higher under the strategy method in period 5. This difference is, however, not significant (two-sample test of proportions, 80% vs. 69%, $p=0.106$). Hence, aggregate giving rates indicate that behavior is consistent across elicitation methods in both treatments and elicitation periods. As outlined in the design section, the main purpose of also using the direct strategy method
was to give participants the opportunity to learn the game and learn their label-contingent inclination to help which in turn allows them to formulate strategies. When turning to the tests of our hypothesis, in the following we therefore focus on the data elicited via the strategy method.

### 3.3.3 Strategy profiles

We now consider the strategy profile of our participants, which are not available in BKO since BKO used only the direct elicitation method and many participants were never faced with the full range of labels. We use strategies elicited using the strategy method in the 5th period, which occurs after two periods of experience dealing with second-order information, and in the 11th period, which is the (unannounced) last period.

**Composition of strategies (Hypothesis 1)** Table 4 reports the number of subjects employing each type of strategy, with strategies labeled as in the theoretical part. We find that the majority of subjects follow one of the four predicted equilibrium strategies. Indeed, predicted strategies account for 85% (low cost) and 76% (high cost) of individual strategies in period 5, and account for 81% (low cost) and 73% (high cost) of individual strategies in period 11. We can therefore state the following result:

**Result 1** *In both treatments more than 3/4 of the participants follow one of the predicted equilibrium strategies.*

We consider next whether this 75% share is consistent with our hypothesis whereby 100% of participants play equilibrium strategies. In order to do so, we have to take into account individual errors in implementation that capture unintended defection in our model (parameter $\eta$). Such errors may lead subjects to specify off-equilibrium strategies. We thus compute the aggregate share of the equilibrium strategies (ASES) we should actually expect to observe given errors of implementation if we assume that all subjects intended to play equilibrium strategies. The ASES is $(1 - \eta)^2(1 + \eta)^2 - (\alpha + \beta)(1 - \eta)^2(1 + \eta)2\eta + (1 - \eta)^24\eta^2x_{(1,1,1,1)}$, where $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are defined in the proposition. This proposition also provides upper and lower bounds on $x_{(1,1,1,1)}$, which we can then translate into corresponding bounds on ASES for a given $\eta$. 

20
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Period 5</th>
<th>Period 11</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Stability*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low cost (c/b=1/5)</td>
<td>High cost (c/b=2/5)</td>
<td>Low cost (c/b=1/5)</td>
<td>High cost (c/b=2/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1111</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1110</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1101</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total in equilibrium set</strong></td>
<td>71</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I010</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0110</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0010</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total not in equilibrium set</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stability*: Maintain strategy or switch within equilibrium strategy set.

Table 4: Distribution and stability of strategies across treatments.
We estimate individual implementation error $\eta$ by comparing answers by our participants in periods 5 and 11 to what they did in periods 4 and 10. Participants received no new information about the distribution of labels between periods 4 and 5, and between periods 10 and 11, as they received no second-order information about their randomly assigned partner in periods 5 and 11. They therefore had the same information as in periods 4 and 10, respectively, so that differences in the decision to help in period 4 (10) for a given observed label and the decision in period 5 (11) for that label is a good measure of possible implementation errors. The average error rate, $\eta$, was 7.5% when aggregating over treatments and periods (Table A.4 in the Appendix). The 95% exact (Clopper-Pearson) binomial confidence interval for this statistic is [4.5%, 11.5%].

Given the above confidence interval estimate for $\eta$, we obtain an average ASES of about 71% with a confidence interval of [55%, 82%] for both treatments. Hence, the share of participants who are observed playing equilibrium strategies in our experiment is consistent with our measure of implementation errors and the hypothesis that every player adheres to one of the predicted equilibrium strategies. Note that while individual errors of implementation can account for the infrequent observation of most off-equilibrium strategies, the observed share of unconditional defectors is higher than what could be explained with implementation errors alone. We elaborate on this in our discussion.

Comparison across treatments (Hypothesis 2) We now compare the frequency of different types of strategies across treatments. We can reject the hypothesis that the frequency of use of strategies does not differ across treatments, either in period 5 (Pearson’s $\chi^2=10.44$, $p=0.034$) or in period 11 (Pearson’s $\chi^2=18.30$, $p=0.001$). There are therefore significant differences in the distribution of strategies across treatments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Period 5</th>
<th>Period 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1111</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1110</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1101</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Posterior probabilities, $p$, that proportions in the low cost treatment, $s_L$, are higher than in the high cost treatment ($s_H$).

We perform a Bayesian estimation of a model of multinomial proportions over all strategies, so as to express posterior probabilities that the difference in the proportions of each strategy across treatments are greater than zero (Table 5). We find that the share
of unconditional cooperators and first-order discriminators is likely to be equal or higher in the high cost treatment than in the low cost treatment in period 11, while the share of $(1, 1, 0, 1)$-players is likely to be lower. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2. In contrast to our prediction, the share of $(1, 1, 1, 0)$-players, however, is likely to be lower in the high cost treatment. Overall, we can state the following result:

**Result 2** The mix of strategies followed by participants differs across treatment. Three out of 4 of the differences in the frequency of strategies are consistent with Hypothesis 2.

**Stability of strategy choices** We test the stability of equilibrium $E_3$ by considering whether there are fewer changes of strategies between periods 5 and 11 by participants who follow equilibrium strategies than by participants who follow non-equilibrium strategies. As a first indication of overall stability, a multinomial chi-square test of frequencies cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no change in the frequencies of strategies from period 5 to period 11, either in the low cost treatment (Pearson’s $\chi^2=5.38$, $p=0.251$) or in the high cost treatment (Pearson’s $\chi^2=4.32$, $p=0.365$). There are therefore only limited changes in the mix of strategies over time in both treatments.

We then analyze whether participants who adopt strategies that correspond to our predictions do so with more consistency than individuals who adopt other strategies. If this is so, this allows us to argue that other strategies correspond to mistakes by participants or to an unfinished learning process. The two columns labeled “stability” in Table 4 show how many participants use the same strategy in period 11 as in period 5. Overall, about 2/3 of participants in both treatments maintained the same strategy from period 5 to period 11. We find that strategies in the equilibrium set are more robust than those outside of it (70% stability within vs. 54% stability outside in the low cost treatment; 72% stability within vs. 50% stability outside in the high cost treatment). This finding is further strengthened when considering how many participants maintain strategies within the equilibrium set or switch within such strategies from period 5 to period 11 (last two columns in Table 4). Overall, 93% of those who employ a strategy within the equilibrium set in period 5 still do so in period 11 in the low cost treatment, and 94% in the high cost treatment. The corresponding stability for non-equilibrium strategies other than $(0, 0, 0, 0)$ is about 40% in both treatments, which is substantially lower. Participants who play the non-equilibrium strategy $(0, 0, 0, 0)$, however, are also highly likely to keep doing so: 71% do so in the low cost treatment, and 83% in the high cost treatment. We summarize these insights in an additional result.

---

10We assign all non-equilibrium strategies other than unconditional defection to the same category.
Result 3 Participants who use predicted equilibrium strategies do so in a more consistent way than those who apply off-equilibrium strategies. Unconditional defectors, however, are also consistent in their use of their strategy.

4 Discussion

Since the mechanism of indirect reciprocity has predominantly been studied in the biological literature, we briefly discuss our theoretical findings in light of this strand of literature. In that literature, it is usually assumed that each player has a binary reputation score, either good or bad. This reputation is observable by all other players and each player applies a behavioral strategy that prescribes the behavior for each reputation score. A large part of the literature studied the dynamics of the behavioral strategies under the assumption that the whole population shares the same social norm, i.e., there is an agreement on what is good and what is bad. Partially, this assumption is made for technical reasons. If multiple social norms coexist then a player might be considered bad by some and good by some others, which makes the analysis of the reputation dynamics almost intractable.

One of the most comprehensive studies in this literature is Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004). They present an exhaustive analysis of all reputations dynamics that assign a binary reputation (good or bad) to each player when his action, his current reputation, and the opponent’s reputation are given. They identify and characterize eight reputation dynamics, which they name the “leading eight,” that can maintain a high level of cooperation. As a common characteristics, they share the property that, for someone with a good reputation, helping is considered to be good behavior whereas refusing to help is thought of as bad. They also share the characteristic that refusal to help a bad individual does not undermine the reputation of a good person. The “leading eight” do not, however, all agree in their evaluation of a behavior that was undertaken by a person with a bad reputation. The leading eight differ mostly in the way in which helping someone with a bad reputation is evaluated.

We refrained from making the assumption of an universally shared social norm in society and focused on the coevolution of strategies that can condition on some recent histories of the game. Note that a player may cooperate for different reasons. Cooperation may not only reflect some normative judgment of the opponent’s past behavior but it may also involve strategic reasoning regarding the reaction of other players in the future. However, under the assumption that a player’s cooperative act can be interpreted as a
moral judgment of the opponent’s past play our results can be interpreted as an analysis of the coevolution of social norms under indirect reciprocity. In light of this interpretation, the aforementioned commonalities of the leading eight correspond to strategies which cooperate in the case of the label \(CC\) and refuse to help in the case of \(DC\), which is the case for all of our conditional cooperative equilibrium strategies. Interestingly, the fact that all equilibrium strategies prescribe cooperation in the case of the label \(CD\) points toward two particular reputation systems among the leading eight.\(^{11}\) The first is known as the “standing strategy” first proposed by Sugden (1986). The second differs from standing by always assigning a good reputation to someone who refuses to help a bad person. Thus, based on our results we may conjecture that a coevolutionary analysis of the leading eight reputation dynamics would reveal a particular role of these two systems.

Due to the aforementioned difficulties of a coevolutionary analysis there is only one recent study on this topic. Yamamoto et al. (2017) show with agent-based simulations that after cooperation is achieved four strategies coexist. These four strategies are exactly those four strategies constituting equilibrium set \(E_3\).\(^{12}\) Thus, our theoretical results may provide the analytic foundation of their simulation results.

Finally, as highlighted by our first experimental result, in light of individual implementation errors we cannot reject the hypothesis that all players adhere to one of the predicted equilibrium strategies. Although implementation errors can account for the infrequent occurrence of most non-equilibrium strategies, they fail to rationalize the significant and stable share of unconditional defectors. This might indicate that our theory misses a relevant driver for the participants’ strategic and moral considerations or might simply reflect a player who did not fully grasp the structure of the game. The latter might induce unconditional defection as the direct rewards from defection are easier to comprehend than the uncertain and indirect benefits from cooperation.

### 5 Conclusion

In this paper we present an analytically tractable evolutionary model of indirect reciprocity and provide evidence from a laboratory experiment. Instead of assuming that each societal member abides by the same reputation mechanism, we analyze the coevolution of strategies that differ in how they condition on publicly available second-order information about opponents’ past behavior. We fully characterize the evolutionary stable equilibria

\(^{11}\)In the model of Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004) this would be captured by \(d_{\text{UC}}=1\).

\(^{12}\)In the notation of Yamamoto et al. (2017) these strategies are \((GGGG)\), \((GGBG)\), \((GGGB)\), and \((GGBB)\).
in this game and study their comparative statics with respect to the cost-benefit ratio. Surprisingly, there exist only two stable cooperative equilibria in the 15-dimensional population state space. These equilibria are also of low complexity, the first is a population state constituted by two strategies, the second is a linear set of population states with two additional strategies. In our laboratory experiment we employed the strategy method to gain full information about participants’ strategies and we implemented two treatments with different cost-benefit ratios. More than 75% of the participants’ elicited strategies correspond to one of the four predicted equilibrium strategies. Moreover, most differences in the distribution of strategies across treatments were in line with our predictions.

The theoretical results and the experimental evidence regarding the presence of strategies which rely on second-order information reemphasize the relevance of higher-order information to promote cooperation under indirect reciprocity. Our results highlight the importance of the coevolutionary perspective as we find no cooperative equilibrium constituted by a homomorphic population. We also shed some light on the issue of selection among different reputation mechanisms. We identify a particularly important strategy which is present in both equilibria and discriminates based on second-order information. This strategy only punishes a partner who behaved non-cooperatively toward a formerly cooperative subject. It prescribes cooperation, however, if the current partner’s non-cooperative behavior is justifiable in the sense that his former opponent defected himself. Thus, our results indicate that the reputation mechanism known as “standing” which was first proposed by Sugden (1986) and identified as one of the “leading eight” by Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004) is of particular importance for the evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity.

This finding may explain the design of a well-documented historical example of a reputation system which relied on second-order information (Greif, 1989). In the 11th Century a group of Mediterranean traders relied on agents to complete some of their business dealings abroad. The immanent moral hazard problem was solved via an informal reputation mechanism described by Greif as follows. “[A]ll coalition merchants agree never to employ an agent that cheated while operating for a coalition member. Furthermore, if an agent who was caught cheating operates as a merchant, coalition agents who cheated in their dealings with him will not be considered by other coalition members to have cheated.” That is, cheating on someone who cheated was not punished.

Finally, given that players’ strategies at least partially reflect the moral judgment of their opponents’ past behavior, the fact that all cooperative equilibria are constituted by a heteromorphic population offers an explanation for the omnipresent heterogeneity in
moral judgments among humans (e.g., Haidt et al., 2009; Weber and Federico, 2013).

References


\section*{A Appendices}

\subsection*{A.1 Proofs}

\textit{Lemma.} Inserting the definition of $p_C(s)$ and $p_C(s, s')$ into the definition of profits given by equation (10) gives us:

$$\Pi_s(\tau; c, \eta) - \Pi_{s'}(\tau; c, \eta) = \sum_{\tilde{s}} x_{\tilde{s}}(\tau)\left(p_C(\tilde{s}, s) - p_C(\tilde{s}, s')\right) - \frac{c}{2} \left(p_C(s) - p_C(s')\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.1)

$$= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\tilde{s}} x_{\tilde{s}}(\tau) \left(p_{\tilde{s}|CC}(p_{CC|s} - p_{CC|s'}) + \ldots + p_{\tilde{s}|DD}(p_{DD|s} - p_{DD|s'})\right)$$

$$- \frac{c}{2} \left((p_{s|CC} - p_{s'|CC})p_{CC} + \ldots + (p_{s|DD} - p_{s'|DD})p_{DD}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.2)

Inserting equations (2)–(5),

$$= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\tilde{s}} x_{\tilde{s}}(\tau) \left(p_{\tilde{s}|CC}(p_{s|CC} - p_{s'|CC})p_{CC} + \ldots + p_{\tilde{s}|DD}(p_{s|DD} - p_{s'|DD})p_{DD}\right)$$

$$- \frac{c}{2} \left((p_{s|CC} - p_{s'|CC})p_{CC} + \ldots + (p_{s|DD} - p_{s'|DD})p_{DD}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.3)

Inserting (1),

$$= \frac{b}{2} \sum_{\tilde{s}} x_{\tilde{s}}(\tau) \left(p_{\tilde{s}|CC}\left((s_1 - s_1')(1 - \eta) + \ldots + (s_4 - s_4')\frac{\eta}{3}\right)(1 - \eta)p_{CC} + \ldots\right.$$

$$\left. + p_{\tilde{s}|DD}\left((s_1 - s_1')(1 - \eta) + \ldots + (s_4 - s_4')\frac{\eta}{3}\right)(1 - \eta)p_{DD}\right)$$

$$- \frac{c}{2} \left((s_1 - s_1')(1 - \eta) + \ldots + (s_4 - s_4')\frac{\eta}{3}\right)(1 - \eta)p_{CC} + \ldots\right.$$

$$\left. + \left((s_1 - s_1')(1 - \eta) + \ldots + (s_4 - s_4')\frac{\eta}{3}\right)p_{DD}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.4)
Applying the definition of the four basic payoff differences,

\[
\frac{1}{2} \left( (s_1-s_1') (1-\eta) \left( (1-\eta) p_{CC} \sum_{s} x_s(\tau)p_{s|CC} + \ldots + \eta \frac{3}{2} p_{DD} \sum_{s} x_s(\tau)p_{s|DD} \right) + \ldots \\
+ (s_4-s_4') (1-\eta) \left( p_{CC} \frac{\eta}{3} \sum_{s} x_s(\tau)p_{s|CC} + \ldots + (1-\eta) p_{DD} \sum_{s} x_s(\tau)p_{s|DD} \right) \right)
\]

Applying the definition of the four basic payoff differences,

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{4} (s_i-s_i') \Delta \Pi_i(\tau; c, \eta) 
\]  

(A.5)

Proposition.

The proof proceeds in two steps. In step one we show that for 26 of the 30 potentially stable equilibria presented in Table 1 there are non-equilibrium strategies yielding strictly higher payoffs contradicting asymptotic stability. The 30 candidates were derived with the help of Mathematica 10 (see supplementary). In step two we analyze each of the remaining equilibria separately.

**Step One**

1. \(\{s_a|s \in S\}\)

For each of the 16 cases we analyze the profits of strategy \(s\) under the condition that \(x_a=1\). It turns that population states with \(x_a=1\) for \(s \in \{(1, 1, 1, 1), (0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1)\}\) are vulnerable for invasions by all defectors, i.e., by strategy \((0, 0, 0, 0)\).

Let \(\Delta \Pi_s = (\Pi_s(\tau, c, \eta) - \Pi_{(0,0,0,0)}(\tau, c, \eta))|_{x_a=1}\). Payoff differences are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta \Pi_{(1,1,1,1)} &= -(1-\eta) \\
\Delta \Pi_{(0,0,0,0)} &= -(1-\eta)(3-2\eta)(3c-7\eta+4\eta^2) \\
\end{align*}
\]

Let \(\Delta \Pi_{(1,1,1,1)} = -(1-\eta) \frac{(3-\eta)(1-\eta)(12-31\eta+23\eta^2-4\eta^3+3c(7-4\eta))}{3c(9+12\eta-31\eta^2+23\eta^3-4\eta^4)}\),

\(\Delta \Pi_{(0,0,0,0)} = -(1-\eta)(3-2\eta)\frac{(3-c(7-4\eta)(3c-7\eta+4\eta^2))}{3c(6-7\eta+4\eta^2)}\),

\(\Delta \Pi_{(0,0,1,1)} = -(1-\eta)(3-2\eta)\frac{c(51-94\eta+689\eta^2-169\eta^3)}{3c(24-22\eta+11\eta^2-4\eta^3)}\)
\[ \Delta \Pi_{(0,0,0,1)} = -\frac{(1-\eta)^2(9+9c-24\eta+22\eta^2-11\eta^3+4\eta^4)}{c(27-45\eta+34\eta^2-11\eta^3+4\eta^4)}. \]

By inspection, \( c \in (0, 1) \) and \( \eta \in (0, \frac{1}{3}) \) imply that all these differences are strictly negative. Moreover, population states with \( x_s = 1 \) for \( s \in \{1, 1.1, 0\}, (1, 1, 0, 1) \) are also vulnerable to invasions.

\[ \Pi_{(1,1,1,0)} - \Pi_{(0,0,0,1)} = \frac{(1-\eta)(3c(27-102\eta+134\eta^2-58\eta^3+8\eta^4)+2(72-342\eta+589\eta^2-447\eta^3+144\eta^4-16\eta^5))}{9c(9+19\eta-23\eta^2+4\eta^3)}, \]
\[ \Pi_{(1,0,1,0)} - \Pi_{(1,1,1,0)} = \frac{(4-\eta)(3-\eta-10\eta^2+8\eta^3)}{3(9+12\eta-31\eta^2+23\eta^3-4\eta^4)}, \]
\[ \Pi_{(0,1,1,0)} - \Pi_{(1,0,1,0)} = \frac{2(1-\eta)^2(3-4\eta)(3+3c-7\eta^2+4\eta^3)}{3c(3-2\eta)(11-10\eta+8\eta^2)}. \]

Again, all these differences are negative. Thus, the remaining candidates are the strategies \((1,1,0,0)\) and \((1,0,0,0)\).

Regarding the former, note that \( \Pi_{(1,1,0,0)} - \Pi_{(1,0,1,0)} = 0 \) for population states with \( x_{(1,1,0,0)} + x_{(0,1,0,1)} = 1 \). Hence, the population state \( x_{(1,1,0,0)} = 1 \) cannot be stable as an equilibrium point. In the case of the latter, it turns out that either \((1,1,0,0)\) or \((0,0,0,0)\) earns strictly higher payoffs in a population state with \( x_{(1,0,0,0)} = 1 \). First,
\[ \Pi_{(1,0,0,0)} - \Pi_{(1,1,0,0)} = \frac{(1-\eta)\eta(2(1-\eta)^3(9-4\eta)(3-4\eta)-3c(36-99\eta+143-58\eta^2))}{9c(18-\eta(2+\eta)(11-4\eta))}, \]
and second, \( \Pi_{(1,0,0,0)} - \Pi_{(0,0,0,0)} = \frac{(1-\eta)\eta(21-12\eta-((1-\eta)^2(3-4\eta))/c)}{54-3h(2+\eta)(11-4\eta)}. \)
In sum, only the population state \( x_{(0,0,0,0)} = 1 \) may constitute a stable equilibrium point.

2. \((x_{(1,1,0,1)}, x_{(0,1,0,1)})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \((1,1,0,1)\) and \((0,1,0,1)\) a state characterized by \( x_{(1,1,0,1)} + x_{(0,1,0,1)} = 1 \) is vulnerable to an invasion by strategy \((1,1,1,0)\). Under the restriction to \( \eta \in (0, \frac{1}{3}) \), the condition \( x_{(1,1,0,1)} \in (0, 1) \) reduces to \( c \in \left(0, \frac{(3-\eta)(1-\eta)^2(3-4\eta)(9-(3-\eta)(7-4\eta))}{3(27-\eta(99-\eta(174-\eta(143-58\eta+8\eta^2))))}\right) \). In this range of cost-benefit ratios the payoff difference \( \Pi_{(1,1,0,1)} - \Pi_{(1,1,1,0)} \) is strictly negative.

3. \((x_{(1,0,0,0)}, x_{(0,0,0,0)})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \((1,0,0,0)\) and \((0,0,0,0)\) a state characterized by \( x_{(1,0,0,0)} + x_{(0,0,0,0)} = 1 \) is vulnerable to an invasion by strategy \((1,1,0,0)\). Under the restriction to \( \eta \in (0, \frac{1}{3}) \), the condition \( x_{(1,0,0,0)} \in (0, 1) \) reduces to \( c \in \left(0, \frac{(1-\eta)^2(3-4\eta)}{3(7-4\eta)}\right) \). In this range of cost-benefit ratios the payoff difference \( \Pi_{(1,0,0,0)} - \Pi_{(1,1,0,0)} \) is strictly negative.

4. \((x_{(1,1,0,1)}, x_{(1,0,0,1)})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \((1,1,0,1)\) and \((1,0,0,1)\) a state characterized by \( x_{(1,1,0,1)} + x_{(1,0,0,1)} = 1 \) is vulnerable to an invasion by strategy \((1,1,1,0)\). Under the restriction to \( \eta \in (0, \frac{1}{5}) \), the condition \( x_{(1,1,0,1)} \in (0, 1) \) reduces to \( c \in \left(\frac{(1-\eta)(3-4\eta)(45-2\eta)(81-2\eta)(46-\eta(23-4\eta))}{9(15-\eta(31-\eta(23-4\eta)))}, \right) \left(\frac{(3-\eta)(1-\eta)^3(15-4\eta)(3-4\eta)}{9(15-\eta(31-\eta(23-4\eta)))}\right) \). In this range of cost-benefit ratios the payoff difference \( \Pi_{(1,1,0,1)} - \Pi_{(1,1,1,0)} \) is strictly negative.
5. \((x_{0,1,0,0}, x_{0,0,0,0})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \((0,1,0,0)\) and \((0,0,0,0)\) a state characterized by \(x_{0,1,0,0} + x_{0,0,0,0} = 1\) is vulnerable to an invasion by strategy \((1,1,0,1)\). Under the restriction to \(\eta \in (0, \frac{1}{2})\), the condition \(x_{0,1,0,0}(0,1)\) reduces to \(c \in \left(0, \frac{(1-\eta)(3-4\eta)(3-\eta(1-\eta))}{3(6-\eta(2-4\eta))}\right)\). In this range of cost-benefit ratios the payoff difference \(\Pi_{(0,1,0,0)} - \Pi_{(1,1,0,1)}\) is strictly negative.

6. \((x_{1,1,1,1}, x_{1,1,0,0})\)

It turns out that there are parameter constellations, for instance, \((c = \frac{1}{8}, \eta = \frac{3}{32})\) such that the equilibrium strategies \((1,1,1,1)\) and \((1,1,0,1)\) earn the same and strictly highest payoff in a state characterized by \(x_{1,1,1,1} + x_{1,1,0,0} = 1\). Thus, this equilibrium is a candidate to be considered in step two.

7. \((x_{1,1,1,0}, x_{1,1,0,0})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \((1,1,1,0)\) and \((1,1,0,0)\) a state characterized by \(x_{1,1,1,0} + x_{1,1,0,0} = 1\) is vulnerable to an invasion by strategy \((0,0,0,0)\). Under the restriction to \(\eta \in (0, \frac{1}{2})\), the condition \(x_{1,1,1,0}(0,1)\) reduces to \(c \in \left(\frac{(1-\eta)(3-4\eta)(3-\eta(1-\eta))}{3(45-2\eta(37-\eta(23-4\eta)))}\right)\). In this range of cost-benefit ratios the payoff difference \(\Pi_{(1,1,1,0)} - \Pi_{(0,0,0,0)}\) is strictly negative.

8. \((x_{1,0,1,0}, x_{1,0,0,0})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \((1,0,1,0)\) and \((1,0,0,0)\) a state characterized by \(x_{1,0,1,0} + x_{1,0,0,0} = 1\) is vulnerable to an invasion by strategy \((1,1,0,1)\). Under the restriction to \(\eta \in (0, \frac{1}{2})\), the condition \(x_{1,0,1,0}(0,1)\) reduces to \(c \in \left(\frac{(1-\eta)(3-4\eta)(3-\eta(1-\eta))}{3(45-2\eta(37-\eta(23-4\eta)))}\right)\). In this range of cost-benefit ratios the payoff difference \(\Pi_{(1,0,1,0)} - \Pi_{(1,1,0,1)}\) is strictly negative.

9. \((x_{0,1,1,0}, x_{0,1,0,0})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \((0,1,1,0)\) and \((0,1,0,0)\) a state characterized by \(x_{0,1,1,0} + x_{0,1,0,0} = 1\) is vulnerable to an invasion by strategy \((0,0,0,0)\). Under the restriction to \(\eta \in (0, \frac{1}{2})\), the condition \(x_{0,1,1,0}(0,1)\) reduces to \(c \in \left(\frac{(1-\eta)(3-4\eta)(3-\eta(1-\eta))}{3(45-2\eta(37-\eta(23-4\eta)))}\right)\). In this range of cost-benefit ratios the payoff difference \(\Pi_{(0,1,1,0)} - \Pi_{(0,0,0,0)}\) is strictly negative.

10. \((x_{1,1,1,1}, x_{1,1,1,0})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \((1,1,1,1)\) and \((1,1,1,0)\) a state characterized by \(x_{1,1,1,1} + x_{1,1,1,0} = 1\) is vulnerable to an
invasion by strategy \((0, 0, 0, 0, 0)\). Under the restriction to \(\eta \in (0, \frac{1}{3})\), the condition \(x_{(1,1,1,1)} \in (0, 1)\) reduces to \(c \in \left(0, \frac{4(1-\eta)(3-4\eta)(4-\eta)}{57-12\eta}\right)\). In this range of cost-benefit ratios the payoff difference \(\Pi_{(1,1,1,1)} - \Pi_{(0,0,0,0)}\) is strictly negative.

11. \((x_{(1,1,1,1)}, x_{(1,0,1,0)}, x_{(0,1,1,0)}, x_{(0,0,1,0)})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \(x_{(1,1,1,1)}\), \(x_{(1,0,1,0)}\), \(x_{(0,1,1,0)}\), and \(x_{(0,0,1,0)}\) a state characterized by \(x_{(1,1,1,0)} + x_{(1,0,1,0)} + x_{(0,1,1,0)} + x_{(0,0,1,0)} = 1\) is vulnerable to an invasion by strategy \((1, 1, 0, 1, 0)\). See supplementary for details.

12. \((x_{(1,1,0,1)}, x_{(0,1,0,1)}, x_{(1,0,0,1)}, x_{(0,0,0,1)})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \(x_{(1,1,0,1)}\), \(x_{(0,1,0,1)}\), \(x_{(1,0,0,1)}\), and \(x_{(0,0,0,1)}\) a state characterized by \(x_{(1,1,0,1)} + x_{(1,0,0,1)} + x_{(0,1,0,1)} + x_{(0,0,0,1)} = 1\) is vulnerable to an invasion by strategy \((0, 0, 0, 0)\). See supplementary for details.

13. \((x_{(1,1,1,1)}, x_{(1,1,1,0)}, x_{(1,1,0,1)}, x_{(1,1,0,0)})\)

It turns out that there exist parameter constellations, for instance \((c = \frac{1}{3}, \eta = \frac{1}{8})\) such that the equilibrium strategies earn the same and strictly highest payoffs in a state characterized by \(x_{(1,1,1,1)} + x_{(1,1,1,0)} + x_{(1,1,0,1)} + x_{(1,1,0,0)} = 1\). Thus, this equilibrium set is a candidate to be considered in step two.

14. \((x_{(0,1,1,1)}, x_{(0,1,1,0)}, x_{(0,1,0,1)}, x_{(0,1,0,0)})\)

It turns out that under the assumption of equal profits for strategies \(x_{(0,1,1,1)}\), \(x_{(0,1,1,0)}\), \(x_{(0,1,0,1)}\), and \(x_{(0,1,0,0)}\) a state characterized by \(x_{(0,1,1,1)} + x_{(0,1,1,0)} + x_{(0,1,0,1)} + x_{(0,1,0,0)} = 1\) is vulnerable to an invasion by strategy \((0, 0, 0, 0)\). See supplementary for details.

15. \((x_{(1,1,1,1)}, \ldots, x_{(0,0,0,0)})\)

By definition, in this equilibrium all 16 earn the same payoff. Consequently, there cannot exist a strategy that yields higher payoffs than the equilibrium strategies. However, there exists a subset of this equilibrium set which is unstable such that the neutral drift will eventually shift the population state into that region. The set of population states which satisfy \(\Delta \Pi_i(\tau; c, \eta) = 0, \forall i\) is given by \(\{x \in \Delta_{15} \mid \sum_{s \in S} x_s = 1, x_{(0,1,0,0)} = \gamma + \sum_{s \in S_2} x_s - \sum_{s \in S_3} x_s, x_{(0,0,1,0)} = -\gamma + \sum_{s \in S_4} x_s - \sum_{s \in S_5} x_s\}\), where \(\gamma = \frac{3c}{(1-\eta)(3-4\eta)}\).

\(S_2 = \{x_{(1,0,1,1)}, x_{(0,0,1,1)}, x_{(1,0,0,1)}, x_{(0,0,0,1)}\}\), \(S_3 = \{x_{(1,1,1,0)}, x_{(1,1,0,0)}, x_{(0,1,1,0)}\}\), \(S_4 = \{x_{(1,1,0,1)}, x_{(1,1,0,0)}, x_{(1,0,1,0)}, x_{(1,0,0,1)}\}\), \(S_5 = \{x_{(0,1,1,1)}, x_{(0,0,1,1)}, x_{(0,1,1,0)}\}\). Consider,
for instance, the solution $x(1,1,0,0)=\frac{3c}{3-7\eta+4\eta^2}$, $x(0,0,0,0)=1-\frac{3c}{3-7\eta+4\eta^2}$, $x_s=0$, $\forall s \in S \setminus \{(1,1,0,0),(0,0,0,0)\}$ which satisfies the conditions for existence of this equilibrium, i.e., it solves $\Delta \Pi_i(t; c, \eta)=0$, $\forall i$. It turns out that with the exception of one strictly positive eigenvalue all other eigenvalues are zero. This eigenvalue is given by $\frac{2c\eta(3(1-c)-7\eta+4\eta^2)}{2(1-\eta)(3-4\eta)}$.

Taken together there are three candidates for stable (sets of) population states. The stability of those candidates is analyzed in detail below.

\textit{Step Two}

1. $x(0,0,0,0)$

This equilibrium is stable for all pair of parameters, i.e., for $\frac{c}{\eta} \in (0,1)$ and $\eta \in (0,\frac{1}{5})$. This is because all other strategies earn strictly negative payoffs while $(0,0,0,0)$ earns a payoff of zero. This results from the assumptions that there is no unintended help but only unintended defection and that there are observational errors.

Thus, any strategy which prescribes cooperation for some label will eventually induce cooperation because either this label is present in the population or some other is misperceived as this particular label. As a consequence, individuals playing a strategy different from $(0,0,0,0)$ will bear the cost of cooperation with some probability but will never receive help in a state with $x(0,0,0,0)=1$.

2. $(x(1,1,1,1), x(1,1,0,1))$

Note first that this equilibrium point is internally stable in the sense that an increase in the share of $x(1,1,1,1)$ decreases the payoffs of $(1,1,1,1)$ relative to $(1,1,0,1)$ (see supplementary). Second, as a necessary condition for stability we must have that $\Delta \Pi_i(t; c, \eta)>0$, $i \neq 3$. This guarantees that a deviation from cooperation for labels $CC$, $CD$, or $DD$ is not profitable. Taken together with the requirement that $x(1,1,1,1) \in (0,1)$ this reduces to $\frac{c}{\eta} \in \left(0,\frac{3-10\eta+8\eta^2}{15-22\eta+8\eta^2}\right)$ and $\eta \in (0,\frac{1}{5})$. To establish sufficiency we study the eigenvalues of the linearized system at this equilibrium point. Analytic solutions are presented in the supplementary. It turns out that the conditions $\frac{c}{\eta} \in \left(0,\frac{3-10\eta+8\eta^2}{15-22\eta+8\eta^2}\right)$ and $\eta \in (0,\frac{1}{5})$ imply that all eigenvalues are strictly negative, which establishes the sufficiency of these conditions.

3. $(x(1,1,1,1), x(1,1,1,0), x(1,1,0,1), x(1,1,0,0))$

The condition of being well-defined, i.e., $(x(1,1,1,1), x(1,1,1,0), x(1,1,0,1), x(1,1,0,0)) \in \Delta_3$, reduces with respect $\frac{c}{\eta}$ and $\eta$ to $\frac{c}{\eta} \in \left[\frac{3-10\eta+8\eta^2}{15-22\eta+8\eta^2}, \frac{12-52\eta+72\eta^2-32\eta^3}{15-22\eta+8\eta^2}\right]$ and $\eta \in (0,\frac{1}{5})$. As
a necessary condition for stability we must have that $\Delta \Pi_i(t; c, \eta) > 0, i=1, 2$. This guarantees that a deviation from cooperation for labels $CC$, or $CD$ is not profitable. Taken together with the condition for existence we obtain $c \in \left[ \frac{3-10\eta+8\eta^2}{15-22\eta+8\eta^2}, \frac{3-10\eta+8\eta^2}{6-4\eta} \right)$ and $\eta \in (0, \frac{1}{3})$. Note that at the lower bound of $c$ the equilibria (2) and (3) coincide. That is, the equilibrium set reduces to an equilibrium point with $x_{(1,1,1,1)} + x_{(1,1,0,1)} = 1$.

To establish sufficiency we study the eigenvalues of the linearized system at a point in this equilibrium. It turns out that there is a eigenvalue of zero with multiplicity one, three eigenvalues with multiplicity four, and two non-zero eigenvalues with multiplicity one. The eigenvalue of zero with multiplicity one corresponds to the dimension of the equilibrium set and reflects the vanishing payoff differences for the equilibrium strategies. In other words, the corresponding eigenvector $(1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0, ..., 0)'$ spans this equilibrium set. Note that the equilibrium set connects two facets of 3-simplex. Particularly, at the population state with the minimal share of unconditional cooperators $(x_{(1,1,1,1)} = \frac{\eta(1+2\eta)}{3-5\eta+2\eta^2})$ we have $x_{(1,1,0,0)} = 0$, at the population state that maximizes the share of unconditional cooperators $(x_{(1,1,1,1)} = 1 + \frac{4}{3-4\eta} - \frac{8}{3-2\eta} + \frac{3c(5-4\eta)}{(3-4\eta)^2(1-\eta)})$ the share $x_{(1,1,1,0)}$ vanishes. Thus, the eigenvalue of zero does not cause any issue of instability at the boundaries of this equilibrium set.

The three eigenvalues with multiplicity four are: $e_{2-5} = \frac{2(1-\eta)^2(6-4\eta-3-2\eta(5-4\eta))}{(3-2\eta)(3+6\eta-8\eta^2)}, e_{6-9} = \frac{2(1-\eta)^2(6-4\eta-3-2\eta(5-4\eta))(5-4\eta)}{3(3-2\eta)(3+6\eta-8\eta^2)},$ and $e_{10-13} = \frac{2(1-\eta)^2(6-4\eta-3-2\eta(5-4\eta))(3-5\eta-4\eta^2)}{3(3-2\eta)(3+6\eta-8\eta^2)}$. Note that eigenvalues 2–13 are linear in $\frac{c}{b}$ and do not depend on the chosen element of the equilibrium set. It turns out that they all share the same root. That is, eigenvalues 2–13 are strictly negative if and only if $\frac{c}{b} < \frac{3}{6-4\eta}$. The eigenvalues $e_{14}$ and $e_{15}$ are more complicated expressions, in particular they do depend on the point of the equilibrium set under consideration (see supplementary). However, under the necessary condition $\Delta \Pi_i(t; c, \eta) > 0, i=1, 2$ for any well-defined element of this equilibrium set eigenvalues $e_{14}$ and $e_{15}$ are also strictly negative. Thus, the necessary condition is also sufficient for stability.
A.2 Dynamics of labels

Making use of the identity \( p_{CC}(t) + p_{CD}(t) + p_{DC}(t) + p_{DD}(t) = 1, \forall t \), the recursive system (7) simplifies to \( (p_{CC}(t), p_{CD}(t), p_{DC}(t))^T = (\tilde{w})_{ij} \cdot (p_{CC}(t-1), p_{CD}(t-1), p_{DC}(t-1))^T \):

\[
(\tilde{w})_{ij} = \begin{pmatrix}
\tilde{w}_{11} & \tilde{w}_{12} & 0 \\
\tilde{w}_{21} & \tilde{w}_{22} & \tilde{w}_{23} \\
\tilde{w}_{31} & \tilde{w}_{32} & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

(7)

\( \tilde{w}_{ij} \) are functions of the error \( \eta \) and the population state. The recursive system above is stable if and only if the absolute value of all eigenvalues is below unity. Without any restrictions the eigenvalues are analytically not tractable. Note, however, that for \( \eta = 0 \) \( (\tilde{w})_{ij} \) simplifies to

\[
(\tilde{w})_{ij} = \begin{pmatrix}
\sum_{i \in S_{11}} x_i & \sum_{i \in S_{12}} x_i & 0 \\
\sum_{i \in S_{21}} x_i & \sum_{i \in S_{22}} x_i & \sum_{i \in S_{23a}} x_i - \sum_{i \in S_{23b}} x_i \\
1 - \sum_{i \in S_{11}} x_i & 1 - \sum_{i \in S_{12}} x_i & 0
\end{pmatrix},
\]

(8)

where

\( S_{11} = \{(1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0, 0)\} \),

\( S_{12} = \{(1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0, 0)\} \),

\( S_{21} = \{(1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0, 1)\} \),

\( S_{2a} = \{(1, 1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0)\} \),

and \( S_{2b} = \{(1, 1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0, 1)\} \).

Note that both cooperative equilibria satisfy \( x_{(1,1,1,1)} + x_{(1,1,1,0)} + x_{(1,1,0,1)} + x_{(1,1,0,0)} = 1 \). Under this condition eigenvalues of \( (\tilde{w})_{ij} \) are given by \( \lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 0 \) and \( \lambda_3 = 1 - x_{(1,1,1,1)} - x_{(1,1,0,1)} \).
A.3 Distribution of labels over time, by treatment

Figure 4: Distribution of labels over time, by treatment.

A.4 Errors of implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Period 4 vs. period 5</th>
<th>Period 10 vs. period 11</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low cost treatment</td>
<td>4.8% (63)</td>
<td>9.0% (67)</td>
<td>6.9% (130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High cost treatment</td>
<td>5.5% (55)</td>
<td>10.7% (56)</td>
<td>8.1% (111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.1% (118)</td>
<td>9.8% (123)</td>
<td>7.5% (241)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Error rates, by treatment, in percentage (N in parenthesis).
Error rates are the frequency with which a person stated C for a given label in period 5 or 10 did D for that label in period 4 or 10.

A.5 Instructions

General instructions

1. Welcome and thank you for your participation! At the beginning of the experiment you pulled out a cabin number and an envelope from a basket. PLEASE DO NOT OPEN THE ENVELOPE! We will let you know when you can open the envelope. This will happen only when the experiment is over and you have done ALL the necessary tasks. If you violate this rule and open your envelope beforehand, we will unfortunately be forced to exclude you from the experiment.

2. You can earn an amount of money in this experiment that depends on your choices or those of another person. It is therefore very important that you read all the
instructions thoroughly and completely. Please switch off your mobile phones now! Communication with other participants is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will then come to you and answer your question.

3. In this experiment, as with all experiments in the Göttingen Laboratory of Behavioral Economics (GLOBE), the participants shall not be deceived. If you are in any doubt that the instructions correspond to the truth, then please contact lab@uni-goettingen.de or a member of the Department of Microeconomics (Prof. Keser). All data from this study is stored anonymously and kept strictly confidential.

4. Your earnings are calculated in ECU (Experimental Currency Units). 1 ECU equals 0.10 €. At the end of today’s session, your total earnings will be converted into euros and paid out confidentially and in cash. In addition, you will receive a participation fee of 4 € (40 ECU).

5. You and other participants are part of an experiment. This experiment goes on for several periods. In each period you will be assigned to interact with another person in today’s experiment. You will not meet that person a second time. You will never know who the other people you meet are. The other people will not know your identity.

6. In the experiment you are either a “decision-maker” or a “recipient”. The decision-maker can choose between “keep” and “give.” If the decision-maker chooses “keep”, the decision-maker receives 85 ECU and the recipient receives 40 ECU. If the decision-maker chooses “give,” the decision-maker receives 75 ECU and the recipient receives 65 ECU.

7. A paper in your envelope states whether you are the decider or the recipient. If you are a decision-maker, the paper says “You are the decider.” The paper also says which period will be relevant for payment. Every period can be relevant, but only ONE period will actually be relevant for your payoff. Your decision in the payoff-relevant period determines your payoff and the payoff of the person you met in that period. If you are a recipient, the envelope says “You are a recipient.” Then the decision of another person who was the decision-maker in the payoff-relevant period will determine your payoff.

8. Every participant in this lab can be a decision-maker. Therefore, you should always make your decisions as if you were a decision-maker and as if you were deciding
both your payoff and that of another person. You can not change your decision at
the end of the experiment. We will only implement the decision you made during
the experiment.

9. You are now asked to answer six control questions to check your understanding of
the instructions. The experiment will not begin until all participants have correctly
answered the control questions.

Control questions

1. Which period will be payoff-relevant? (The first period; Period 9; None; I do not
know that in advance. It’s in my envelope.)

2. Will your decisions be payoff-relevant or will decisions made by another person
determine your payoff? (My decisions will be payoff-relevant; The decisions of
another person will determine my payoff; I do not know that in advance. It’s in my
envelope.)

3. How many times will you meet the same person in this experiment? (Once; Every
period; I do not know that in advance.)

4. Will you know which person in the lab you meet in a given period? (Yes; No)

5. Will your identity be revealed to other people in the lab? (Yes; No)

6. Can the experimenters link your decisions with your name? (Yes; No)

Game instructions

1. The experiment begins now.

2. Periods 1 to 4 and 6 to 10:
   In period X, you meet someone new. You have two alternatives to choose from:
   “keep” or “give.” If you choose “keep,” you will receive 85 ECU and the other
   person will receive 40 ECU. If you choose “give”, you will receive 75 ECU and the
   other person will receive 65 ECU.
   [Period 2: The other person has chosen (give/keep) in the last period.
   Period 3 to 4 and 6 to 10: The other person has chosen (give/keep) in the last
   period, when faced with someone whom they knew had chosen (give/keep).]
   Which alternative do you choose? (give/keep)
Info: In the next stage, you will be the recipient and another person will be the decision-maker. This person will know which choice you have made.

/Period 2 to 4 and 6 to 10/: Info: In the next stage, you will be the recipient and another person’s decision-maker. This person will know which choice you have made. In addition, this person will learn what the person you have met this turn had chosen before.

3. Feedback: You have chosen (give/keep). The decision maker who meets you now learns that you have chosen (give/keep).

/Period 2 to 4 and 6 to 10/: You have chosen (give/keep). The decision maker who meets you now learns that you have chosen (give/keep) when faced with someone who had chosen (give/keep).

4. Control questions before period 3:
Suppose that one person has chosen (give/keep) when faced with someone whom they knew had chosen (give/keep). Which of the following statements are true?

(a) Question 1: That person had chosen (give/keep) last period.
(b) Question 2: That person had chose (give/keep) two periods ago.
(c) Question 3: The person who was meeting that person had chosen (give/keep) two periods ago.

5. Periods 5 and 11:
In period X, we ask you about your decision plan for this period. We ask for your decision when faced with someone you meet during this period. You will see various possible information about the other person’s decision. For each case you have to make a decision. Only at the end of the experiment, and if this period X is relevant, will we give you information about the actual decision of the other person. Your decision for the relevant case will then be executed and you will receive the appropriate payoff. Please make sure that your decisions are in line with what you want to see done at the end of the experiment!
You have two alternatives to choose from: “keep” or “give.” If you choose “keep,” you will receive 85 ECU and the other person will receive 40 ECU. If you choose “give,” you will receive 75 ECU and the other person will receive 65 ECU.
(The order of the following questions was randomized)

(a) Suppose that person chose to give in the last period, when faced with someone
they knew had chosen to give before. Which alternative would you choose in this case?

(b) Suppose that person chose to give in the last period, when faced with someone they knew had chosen to keep before. Which alternative would you choose in this case?

(c) Suppose that person chose to keep in the last period, when faced with someone they knew had chosen to give before. Which alternative would you choose in this case?

(d) Suppose that person chose to keep in the last period, when faced with someone they knew had chosen to keep before. Which alternative would you choose in this case?

**Payoffs**

1. The game is now over. An experimenter will go through the lab to make sure none of the envelopes have been opened. Please wait until we let you know that you can open your envelope.

2. In your envelope is a paper telling you whether you are a decision-maker and which period is relevant to your payoff. Please enter “Yes,” if your envelope states that you are the decider. Please also enter the period that appears in your envelope. The experimenter will come to you and will confirm your input so that you get to the last part of the experiment.

3. **Payoffs for the decision-maker:**
   You are a decision-maker. Your decision in period X determines your payoff and the other person’s payoff.

   **Period 1:** In period 1 you chose (give/keep). **Period 2:** In period 2 you chose (give/keep). You knew that the other person had chosen (give/keep) in period 1. **Periods 3 to 11:** In period X you chose (give/keep). You knew that the other person had chosen (give/keep) in period X-1, when faced with someone you knew had chosen (give /keep) in the previous period.

   Therefore, you will receive XXX ECU and the other person will receive XXX ECU. Converted into euros and with a participation fee of 4€, you will get XXX euros. The other person will get XXX Euro.
4. **Payoffs for the recipient:**
   You are a recipient. The decision of another person in period 1 determines your payoff and the payoff of that person.

   **Period 1:** In period 1 the other person has chosen (give/keep). **Period 2:** In period 2 the other person has chosen (give/keep). This person knew that you had chosen (give/keep) in period 1. **Periods 3 to 11:** In period X the other person has chosen (give/keep). This person knew that you had chosen (give/keep) in the period X-1, when faced with someone you knew had chosen (give/keep) in the previous period.

   Therefore, you will receive XXX ECU and the other person will receive XXX ECU. Converted into euros and with a participation fee of 4€, you will get XXX euros. The other person will get XXX Euro.

The payoff stage is now over. We still ask you to answer a number of survey questions, after which you will be able to collect your remuneration.

**Questionnaire**

1. What do you think the experiment was about?

2. Please describe by which criteria you made decisions.

3. Do you think that the information provided to you was sufficient to make your decisions? If not, what else would you have liked to know before you made your decisions?

4. Was it hard for you to understand what you had to do in this experiment?

5. Did you have any difficulties during the experiment? If yes, please describe your difficulties.

6. In how many experiments did you already participate in (approximately)? 1. I have never participated in an experiment before. 2. 1-5 3. More than 5.

7. What kind of interactions did the experiment most likely remind you of? Interactions with 1. family members. 2. friends. 3. classmates/work colleagues. 4. strangers.

8. Do you know one or more of the other people who participated in today’s experiment?
9. Do you think that you are similar to the other participants in today’s experiment?

10. Anna’s father has 5 daughters: Lala, Lele, Lili, Lolo, and .... What is the name of the fifth daughter?

11. On a boat hangs a ladder with five rungs. The distance from one rung to the next is 20cm. The lowest rung touches the water surface. The tide raises the water level by 20cm per hour. How long does it take for the water level to reach the topmost rung? 1. 5 hours. 2. 4 hours. 3. It never reaches it.

12. If it takes 20 minutes to boil a goose egg, how many minutes will it take to boil 3 geese eggs? 1. One hour. 2. 20 minutes.

13. Linda is 31 years old, single, very intelligent, and openly speaks her mind. She studied philosophy. During her studies, she dealt extensively with issues of equal rights and social justice and also took part in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which statement is most likely to apply to Linda? 1. Linda is a bank clerk. 2. Linda is a bank clerk and is active in a feminist movement.

Finally, we would like to have some information about you.

1. How old are you? Please type in.

2. What is your gender?

3. What is your living situation? 1. I do not live alone. 2. I live alone.

4. Do you live in Göttingen?

5. Do you have German citizenship?

6. Are you worried about covering your living expenses over the next six months?

7. Do you think you are financially better off than others in your age group?

8. Are you currently enrolled for a degree?

9. Did you study economics in the past or are you now studying economics?

We thank you for your participation! You will now be called individually to receive your payment. Please come to the experimenter in the entrance area when your cabin number is called up. Please make sure you take all your belongings with you so you do not have to go back to the cabin.